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ABSTRACT 
 
 This research integrates the theoretical perspectives of three separate but related 
areas of social-psychological research to hypothesize about relationships between the 
emotion of empathy and an individual’s effort to extend helping behaviors to out-groups. 
The literatures on social justice, prosocial behavior, and group stereotypes are reviewed. 
An experimental study manipulated empathic concern for an out-group by varying the 
perspective through which participants interpret an experience that is had by a fictional 
immigrant group to America. In addition, the study manipulated the stereotypes that 
characterized the immigrant group.  The effects of these independent variable 
manipulations on psychometric measures of empathic concern, helping behaviors, 
identity considerations, and personal distress were assessed. Findings suggest that 
instructions to take the perspective of an out-group described as socially cold and 
incompetent results in significantly less helping compared to a control group. Results are 
discussed in reference to the theory and practice of intergroup relations.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 In a world with increasingly global undertones, efforts to understand the social-
psychological dynamics that are involved in intergroup helping behaviors are more 
needed than ever. The various world media are replete with examples of efforts to 
marshal and to increase helping behaviors for various out-groups (e.g., hurricane Katrina 
victims, the victims of the earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan, Sudanese refugees). Yet 
social psychology, a discipline uniquely suited to provide scientific guidance toward this 
end, has yet to develop a theoretical perspective with which to pose questions about when 
and why individuals and groups may extend, or withhold, helping behaviors to out-
groups. The research reported here attempts to address this void in the literature by 
integrating the insights offered by social-psychological approaches to justice, prosocial 
behavior, and group stereotypes in order to provide initial understanding of which types 
of out-groups are more or less likely to receive help from others.  
As societies have evolved, the universality of social justice concerns has emerged from 
numerous philosophical discussions, lay people’s reactions to justice and injustice, as 
well as empirical research. Social justice standards are of particular interest to social 
psychologists because they are both created and maintained by individuals, groups, 
societies, and cultures (Tyler & Smith, 1998). Given the consensus across disciplines 
such as philosophy, law, political science, and psychology that justice is indeed 
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important, it is necessary to attempt to understand justice phenomena and their 
implications for behavior. The social-psychological study of justice has grown over the 
last six decades in response to this need. Contemporary justice studies are attempting to 
isolate specific processes responsible for justice effects and have thus become extremely 
focused in their approach. The initial investigations into the psychology of justice, 
however, formed both the intellectual foundation as well as the theoretical framework 
upon which current research is based.   
The first two decades of the social psychology of justice evolved according to two 
sequential lines of thought. Beginning with social exchange theory and continuing into 
the 1960s, distributive justice theories attempted to answer questions regarding how 
people evaluate the fairness of the outcomes that they receive from social interactions 
(Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Adams, 1965). Although distributive justice theories vary in  
their specific focus and implications, they converge in their shared assumption that the 
primary motivation underlying social relationships is to maximize self-interest.  
What mattered to people according to distributive theories was having control 
over the outcomes of social interactions (i.e., outcome control). Importantly, the 
distributive justice theories reflected the reality that people did not evaluate justice 
according to the outcomes received from a single social interaction. Rather, this literature 
suggested that, to the extent that an individual’s exchange relationships were favorable 
over time, individuals evaluated them as ―fair‖ and were likely to maintain them.  
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The second major line of thought in justice literature took place in the 1970s, 
when researchers began to ask subjects to describe experiences of injustice (Tyler & 
Smith, 1998). These individuals did not describe these experiences in terms of unfair 
outcomes. Instead, the events subjects described reflected concerns about violations of 
interpersonal considerations—elements that were directly tied to group procedures. 
Procedural justice theories thus evolved to answer questions regarding how people 
evaluate specific procedures that lead to the outcomes of social interactions. A core 
postulate of the procedural justice models is that individuals are sensitive to the process 
by which decisions are made. In their pioneering work on procedural justice, Thibaut and 
Walker (1975) suggested that procedural considerations included process control 
elements such as the opportunity to present one’s views (i.e., having ―voice‖), having 
those views considered by a decision-maker, and having some control over the 
presentation of evidence relevant to decision-making.  
As value-expressive theories of justice, procedural justice models suggest that the 
elements of process control are valuable in their own right and often are more important 
than outcome control. To understand the roots of the relevance of process control, justice 
researchers looked to the theoretical framework of social identity theory, which addresses 
the general motivation behind individual involvement with groups (Tajfel, 1982). Social 
identity theory postulates that an individual’s personal identity and social identity are 
components of that individual’s self-concept. Consequently, an individual’s social 
identities have direct bearing upon the way that individual evaluates himself or herself. 
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Because the core motivation underlying social identity theory is that individuals seek to 
have a positive self-concept, the theory postulates that individuals strive to achieve and 
maintain a positive social identity. Therefore, people will be more attracted to groups that 
achieve this end.  
Reflecting the motivational aspects of social identity theory, the group-value 
model of justice builds upon the premise that people rely upon the degree of process 
control afforded to them in order to glean information about the quality of their social 
relationships within groups. Specifically, group procedures for treating individual group 
members are postulated to communicate information regarding one’s relative position 
within the group, as well as the position of the group as a whole (Tyler, Degoey, & 
Smith, 1996; Tyler & Blader, 2002). This information is presumably conveyed by the 
relational implications of the extent to which authority figures display neutrality, 
trustworthiness, and status recognition towards their subordinates (Tyler, et al., 1996).  
According to this perspective, group authorities are considered to be prototypical 
representatives of groups; as such, the behaviors of authority figures in groups are 
considered salient indicators of group opinions and values. Fair treatment by the group 
(i.e., fair procedures), within the framework of the group-value model, transmits to 
individuals that they are valued and respected group members. This information, in turn, 
has direct implications for self-evaluation, reflecting the core premise of social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tyler, et al., 1996).  
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Despite the focus of distributive justice theories on outcome control and the focus 
of procedural justice theories on process control, both types of theories share in common 
the fact that they are highly individualistic. That is, whether the motivation is to 
maximize outputs or to feel like a valued and respected group member, the level of 
analysis that is relevant for these theories is the individual. Reflecting this reality, a vast 
body of social justice research now exists that investigates the determinants of justice 
evaluations for individuals (Rasinski, 1987; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, 
Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985).  
The next development of the social justice literature reflected an interest in the 
implications of group-level variables on the justice evaluations of individuals. Some of 
this work reflected the fact that different countries around the world had much different 
ideas about what was ―fair‖ in terms of democratic representation in government bodies 
(Lijphart, 1984), and that to some extent, different ideas about fairness were due to 
individual differences in value orientations such as economic individualism (Deutsch, 
1975; Rasinski, 1987; Stouten, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2005; but see Van den Bergh, 
Dewitte, & De Cremer, 2006, for interesting qualifications). Other research built upon 
this general line of reasoning by investigating how different-sized factions within the 
same group evaluated the fairness of superordinate group decision-making procedures 
(Azzi, 1992, 1993; Azzi & Jost, 1997; Jost & Azzi, 1996).  
Reflecting the next logical step, researchers began investigating the relational 
implications of the group-value model in organizational contexts and discovered that 
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identification with a superordinate group (e.g., a work organization) was associated with 
an increased emphasis on relational concerns (i.e., process control) over outcome control 
in the context of conflicts among members of different subgroups (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & 
Lind, 1996; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998). The overarching concern among 
these researchers was whether or not this promotion of relational concerns came at the 
expense of an individual’s subgroup identity (defined in this research as ethnicity). 
Among those highly identified with the superordinate group, relational concerns were 
found to weigh more heavily than outcome concerns in terms of predicting acceptance of 
the decisions of a superordinate authority figure, irrespective of whether or not the 
decision-maker was a member of the perceiver’s ethnic subgroup. That is, although 
members of ethnic subgroups were sometimes faced with an unfavorable decision by an 
authority figure representing a different subgroup than their own, if they strongly 
identified with the organization, they accepted the decision to the extent that they were 
afforded acceptable levels of process control. Unfavorable outcomes in this case did not 
come at the expense of subgroup identity.  In contrast, it was found that outcome 
concerns predicted decision acceptance for those who had weaker levels of superordinate 
identification with the organization. Although the research by Huo and her colleagues 
(Huo, et al., 1996) was correlational, it was important to the development of social justice 
theory because it indicated that the benefits of superordinate identification need not 
necessarily come at the expense of loyalty to one’s subgroup. Studies that have 
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experimentally manipulated superordinate identification have replicated the dominance of 
procedural justice effects among the highly identified (De Cremer, 2006).  
Importantly, however, research findings such as these should not be interpreted as 
suggesting that outcomes do not matter as long as authority figures give process control 
to their subordinates. This is especially important to realize in real-world organizational 
contexts in which the potential for authority figures to abuse the non-instrumental effects 
of process control is both very high as well as extremely plausible (Lind, Kanfer, & 
Earley, 1990). Lind and his colleagues explicitly stated in the discussion section of their 
1990 paper that individuals faced with repeated denials of outcomes would not be forever 
satisfied by just having their voices heard. A recent meta-analysis reinforces this 
conclusion by indicating that while procedural justice considerations like process control 
do lessen the negative impact of unfavorable outcomes, they cannot totally eliminate 
these effects (Cohen-Carash & Spector, 2001). In fact, in some situations, group 
identification may actually exacerbate the impact of negative outcomes, irrespective of 
process control. In a revealing demonstration of this possibility, recent research suggests 
that, in group contexts in which social identity is relevant, collective outcomes are more 
important than voice considerations, and increasing levels of social identification 
intensify this effect (Leung, Tong, & Lind, 2007).  
Another area of justice research focused on reactions to experiences of injustice 
within a group. One such study was conducted in which three-person groups experienced 
the same overall level of unfair treatment under one of two conditions: Either the 
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injustice was concentrated upon one group member, or the injustice was distributed 
across all group members. Participants evaluated the fairness of their experiences both 
before and after group discussion (Lind, Kray, & Thompson, 1998). The authors argued 
that the discussion would provide a larger pool of instances of fair/unfair actions than 
would individual experience. Therefore, these authors argued, it was logical to expect 
that individuals would use the discussion information when they generated an overall 
impression of their experiences. Results generally supported this argument, but with 
interesting qualifications. As predicted, the supervisor was rated less favorably in 
concentrated versus distributed injustice conditions, but the relative weight given to the 
injustices experienced by another in participants’ fairness evaluations was much less than 
that given to personal experiences of injustice. In fact, analyses revealed that it took 
roughly three times as much injustice to another to produce the same weight as a small 
amount of personally experienced injustice (Lind, et al., 1998).  
Of the social justice literature that recognizes the importance of group-level 
variables, a vast majority is decidedly intra-group in nature (but see Azzi, 1992; 1993; 
Jost & Azzi, 1997; Azzi & Jost, 1996). For example, the group-value model of justice 
(Tyler, et al., 1996) has elicited many investigations of how group-level procedures affect 
the experiences of individuals within groups. Research that has been conducted from the 
group-value model perspective has investigated the efficacy of procedural justice 
variables such as process control to ameliorate conflicts among subgroups, but has done 
so by implicating the role of an overarching group membership that subsumes the 
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different subgroups (Huo, et al., 1996). Thus, although the conflicts of interest in these 
studies may be intergroup in nature (i.e., conflicts among different subgroups within an 
organization), the processes which are assumed to lead to successful resolution arise from 
an intra-group phenomenon that either dissolves or makes secondary the intergroup 
distinction (e.g., superordinate identification with the organization as a whole). The 
existing group-level social justice literature, therefore, is mostly silent about truly 
intergroup justice phenomena.  
This limitation in the justice literature may be inherent to the very definition of 
justice as we currently understand it. Philosophers throughout history have discussed 
justice as a benefit that is (or should be) provided by the state or nation to its citizenry. 
Aristotle, in his earliest writings on the subject, suggested that justice referred to one’s 
fellow citizens (Balot 2001, 1-44). Although he did not explicitly state that justice did not 
apply to individuals outside of that category, he did imply this point by stating that the 
law (and thus justice) applied only to citizens of a particular state, and not to those 
outside of it. Although he was not a social psychologist in the academic sense, when 
Aristotle spoke about justice in these terms, his became the first recorded mention of the 
idea that justice was only relevant inside of some shared category membership. To the 
extent that this perspective has been historically enduring, it is not at all surprising that 
there is very little social justice research from a truly intergroup perspective. Indeed, the 
very concept of justice may have meaning (psychologically and sociologically, if not 
logically) only for the in-group and thus may be categorically deactivated for outsiders. 
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Within social psychology, Morton Deutsch (1979) was the first to suggest that 
there was a ―scope,‖ or a limited range to the social relationships in which justice 
principles are applied. The essence of this idea was made formal in the construct of moral 
exclusion, whereby certain individuals or groups are perceived to be outside the boundary 
in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply (Opotow, 1990). One 
way that the limits of one’s scope of justice have been explained is from a moral or 
symbolic perspective, which suggests that issues of social identification motivate 
exclusion (Tyler & Smith, 1998). Specifically, people react more strongly to injustice that 
is done to others if they identify with them in some way. It is much more difficult (if not 
impossible) to motivate people to extend justice considerations to members of a group 
with which they do not identify (Huo, 1994; Wenzel, 2001; 2002; Lowenstein & Small, 
2007). Whether and by what process individuals can be motivated to extend justice 
considerations to out-groups without an induction of a common identity is an important 
area of both theoretical and practical concern.  
How can individuals be motivated to care about out-groups with whom they do 
not identify? As indicated previously, the prevailing wisdom of the social psychology of 
justice appears to suggest that motivating people to care about the injustices of out-
groups without appealing to a superordinate identification is either extremely difficult or 
impossible (Huo, 1994; Wenzel, 2001; Wenzel, 2002). Fortunately, however, social 
psychology literature outside of the justice tradition suggests that individuals can be 
motivated to help other individuals with whom they share no common identity via the 
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motivation induced by empathy, defined as an other-oriented emotional response 
corresponding to the perceived welfare of a person in need (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & 
Shaw, 1995), or more generally as ―emotional sensitivity to others‖ (De Waal, 2008). The 
notion of need discussed in the empathy literature is a direct connection to the justice 
literature, as previous theorizing has already established that need is a general principle 
underlying justice evaluations regarding the well-being of others (Deutsch, 1979). 
Furthermore, to the extent that helping behavior can be equated with justice behavior 
(i.e., supporting social policies that protect the rights of out-groups), the conceptual 
connections between the justice and empathy literatures are clear. If individuals can also 
be motivated via empathy to help entire groups (and not just specific individuals that 
represent those groups) with whom they do not share a common identity, then there is the 
possibility that social justice theory could be extended, via a theoretical integration with 
the empathy literature, to a truly intergroup level of analysis.  
Empathy’s potential as a theoretical framework for intergroup justice depends, 
however, on the precise nature of the motivational underpinnings of helping behaviors 
elicited by empathy.  
 There is significant debate within the field about this issue. These disagreements 
will be more explicitly outlined in following sections, but the gist of the divergence is 
that researchers disagree about whether empathy is motivated by altruism (a selfless 
desire to help another) or egoism (helping the other to somehow benefit the self). To the 
extent that empathy elicits helping behavior that is altruistically motivated, an 
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individual’s justice concerns could be extended to out-groups independently of the 
process of superordinate identification. To the extent that empathy results in helping 
behavior that is in any way egoistically motivated, however, superordinate identification 
could not be ruled out as an explanation for extending justice concerns to out-groups. An 
egoistic account of the effects of empathy on helping behaviors towards out-groups could 
still be beneficial to justice theorizing, however, by suggesting a way to extend justice 
concerns to out-groups that is independent of a direct appeal to superordinate 
identification. 
 Ultimately, which account (altruism versus egoism) of empathy’s effects on 
helping behavior is correct could be philosophically (and empirically) irresolvable. The 
precise motivational mechanisms underlying such effects, however, are of secondary 
importance to the more general theoretical question of whether or not people can be 
motivated by empathy to extend helping to out-groups. Before this possibility can be 
fully appreciated, a more complete discussion of the literature suggesting that people can 
be motivated by empathy to help other individuals is necessary.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
EMPATHY AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
 Prosocial behavior is defined in the literature as behavior that is intended to 
benefit ―one or more people other than oneself ‖(Batson, 1998, p. 282). The importance 
of the self-other distinction is hardly a novel one in the discussion of behavior towards 
people in need. The intellectual history of the study of human morality has long 
acknowledged the primacy of self-interest in motivating behavior. For example, the 
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1785/1965) contended that acts of human kindness were 
―inherently selfish,‖ and that only acts that were motivated out of a sense of duty were 
worthy of praise. Most accounts of prosocial behavior in the social-psychological 
literature concede that the default response in most situations is to act selfishly, but argue 
that additional mental effort can override the selfish response when one perceives the 
needs of others (Lowenstein & Small, 2007; Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Baumeister, 
Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009). The mental energy required to maintain such effort once it 
is elicited is likely to be substantial. The exhaustive nature of caring for the well-being of 
others is well documented by evidence suggesting that proportionately, people donate 
more money in response to rare disasters such as hurricane Katrina (which took 1,093 
lives) than they donate in response to social problems that are perniciously enduring (e.g., 
approximately 180,000 deaths per month (mostly children under five years of age) due to 
infectious diarrhea associated with unsanitary water) (Epstein, 2006).  
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That more intense human suffering elicits less of a reaction is a phenomenon that 
has been explained by the process of psychological numbing, which suggests that as the 
raw number of lives at risk increases, people are less sensitive to the value of lifesaving 
interventions (Lowenstein & Small, 2007; Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, & Friedrich, 1997). 
Paradoxically then, it seems as though the larger and more severe the social problem, the 
less likely people are to help others in need. Because of this, organizations that provide 
financial relief for long-term human crises advertise for donations by using a single 
individual victim to represent the crisis as a whole. Putting one face to a larger 
catastrophe leads to what is known as the ―identifiable victim‖ effect, which results in 
both more and larger donations to the cause than if the advertisement were to present the 
true magnitude of the potential for loss of life (Epstein, 2006). Psychologically, the 
identifiable victim effect offers an individual two benefits relevant to prosocial behavior 
in contexts of ongoing humanitarian crises. First, a single victim is a sufficient stimulus 
to provide the motivation to overcome the selfish default response and donate money to a 
cause. Second, and more importantly, donating money in response to a single victim 
offers the individual the relatively easy opportunity to bypass the obligation to invest 
emotional energy in the plight of all the others in need—aside from the one ―poster 
child.‖ 
Empathy as an Individual Difference Variable 
To some extent, the degree to which people are sensitive to the needs of others 
(i.e., dispositional empathy) may be rooted in relatively stable personality traits such as 
agreeableness (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007). Although many social-
15 
 
 
psychological investigations of the empathy-helping behavior relationship have focused 
on experimentally manipulating empathy, Graziano and colleagues suggest that for those 
low on agreeableness, such manipulations are less effective in eliciting helping behavior 
when the costs of helping are high. When the costs of helping are low, however, empathy 
manipulations operate as a contextual reminder to those low on agreeableness that they 
should be sensitive to the needs of others. In contrast, people high on the agreeableness 
dimension do not seem to be affected by empathy manipulations (Graziano, et al., 2007).  
Importantly, exposure to the needs of another does not automatically elicit 
empathic concern, even for those who are high on agreeableness. Attributional 
explanations of how motivations arise from emotions suggest that exposure to the needs 
of another evokes a search on the part of the perceiver for the causes of the target’s 
distress. Presumably, of crucial concern for perceivers in these search scenarios are 
indications that the responsibility for the target’s need is internal or external to the target 
(Weiner, 1980; 1986). These explanations contend that to the extent that a person is 
perceived to be responsible for his or her own need, the perceiver is much less likely to 
experience emotional responses such as empathy (but see Batson, Polycarpou, Marmon-
Jones, Imhoff, Mitchener, Bednar, Klein, & Highberger, 1997a for exceptions). Thus, to 
the degree that a tendency to attribute internal causation to the situations of others is an 
individual difference variable, those high on this construct will be less likely to 
experience empathy for a person in need unless explicit information is provided regarding 
an external cause of that person’s suffering. Similarly, perceivers that believe in a just 
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world (i.e., that people get what they deserve), are less likely to empathize with 
individuals in need (Lerner, 1980).  
Empathy as an Experimental Manipulation 
As an experimental manipulation, empathy is presumed to be elicited by 
perspective taking, defined as either actively imagining the experiences and/or feelings of 
another, or as imagining how one would feel in another’s shoes. Developmental 
psychologists have long acknowledged the importance of putting oneself in the position 
of another for social development (Davis, 1983) as well as moral development (Kohlberg, 
1976). For social psychologists studying prosocial behavior, the value of perspective-
taking manipulations that induce empathic concern for people in need is self-evident. As 
mentioned previously, however, there is significant debate regarding the precise nature of 
the motivation (altruistic vs. egoistic) that empathy elicits (c.f. Batson, et al. 1995; 
Cialdini, 1991). Whereas this literature defines egoism as a motivational state with the 
goal of increasing one’s own welfare, altruism is defined as ―a motivational state with the 
ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare‖ (Batson & Shaw, 1991, italics added). To 
the extent that taking the perspective of another leaves the self-other distinction intact, the 
empathic motivation induced by perspective taking can be considered to be altruistic. 
However, to the extent that taking the perspective of another results in a cognitive 
overlapping of the self and other, the motivation induced by perspective taking would be, 
at least in part, egoistic.  
Not surprisingly, researchers arguing from the position of the existence of 
altruism produce research that supports an altruistic account of helping behavior, but 
17 
 
 
researchers arguing from the position of the non-existence of altruism produce research 
that supports a more egoistically driven account of helping behavior. Importantly, both 
the altruism and the egoism approaches agree that a perceiver is emotionally affected 
when he or she observes the suffering of another. What differs between the two 
approaches is the understanding of the nature of the pain that is experienced by the 
perceiver.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ALTRUISM VS. EGOISM DEBATE 
Led by Daniel Batson, researchers from the altruism perspective suggest the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis to explain helping behavior. The hypothesis states that 
empathic emotions such as sympathy, compassion, and tenderness elicit motivation to 
help others, and that the goal of this help is to benefit the person for whom empathy is 
felt—hence indicative of selfless or altruistic motivation (Batson, 1991, 1998; Batson, 
Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-
Benefiel, 1986; Batson, Dyck, Brandt, Batson, Powell, McMaster, & Griffitt, 1988). In 
contrast, researchers from the egoistic perspective suggest that, although empathic 
emotions do elicit motivation to help others, the act of perspective taking creates negative 
consequences for the perceiver, and thus the goal of helping is either to eliminate or to 
reduce the intensity of this negativity (Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps, Fultz, & 
Beaman, 1987; Cialdini, 1991; Maner, Luce, Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, & Sagarin, 
2002). The benefit to the other that results, while prosocial in the definitional sense, is 
selfish in the motivational sense 
Affective Alternatives 
Researchers disagree with Batson and his colleagues about the variables that 
mediate the link between perspective taking and helping behavior. According to Batson’s 
critics, apart from altruism, two other explanations for this relationship are equally
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plausible. First, it has been suggested that observing the suffering of others leads to 
negative affect (e.g., personal distress, fear of negative social sanction for not helping) on 
the part of the perceiver, and that it is the need to alleviate this negative affect that 
motivates individuals to help others (Cialdini, et al., 1987; Cialdini, 1991; Maner, et al., 
2002). If this is the case, then helping behavior elicited by perspective taking can be 
explained by egoism rather than altruism. On a more general level, the ideas put forth in 
such negative-state relief models of helping behavior are at least as old as the thirteenth 
century, when philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas suggested that the suffering 
of others matters most because when we see that others are suffering, we know that their 
plight will soon become our own. This knowledge is presumed to produce a variety of 
negative emotions, all of which are capable of motivating helping behavior independently 
of a pure concern for the well-being of another. Helping others, according to negative-
state relief models, eliminates the stimulus responsible for negative emotions within the 
perceiver.  
In response to the negative-state relief explanations of the empathy-helping 
behavior relationship, altruism researchers have asserted that the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis does not deny that benefits to the self exist—e.g., a reduction of personal 
distress, or avoiding social censure for not helping. Rather, so say these researchers, the 
hypothesis claims that such self-benefits are unintended consequences of actions that 
benefit another, and that self-benefits are secondary to the primary motive of improving 
the situation of the person in need (Batson, et al., 1986; Batson, 1998). Recent research 
along these lines experimentally manipulated the extent to which participants were 
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induced to value the welfare of a person in need, finding that valuing the welfare of 
another explains variance in helping behavior that is independent of the extent to which 
participants empathized with the target. These findings suggest that even if empathy 
manipulations do lead to motivational conflicts that involve the self, at least some helping 
behavior is unique to purely other-related concerns (Batson, Håkansson-Eklund, 
Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007). Note, however, that Batson’s own previous research has 
suggested that perceived similarity manipulations, in and of themselves, affect the extent 
to which individuals value the welfare of a person in need (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 
1995).  
Cognitive-Affective Alternatives 
The second major line along which there is disagreement regarding the effects of 
perspective taking is grounded in the social identity and social cognition literatures. 
Specifically, some researchers draw upon well established social-psychological theories 
such as social identity theory and self categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) to hypothesize about the results of 
perspective-taking manipulations meant to induce empathy for others in need. These 
researchers suggest that a result of perspective taking is an increase in perceptions of the 
extent to which the self and other are similar. This perceived similarity then leads to a 
cognitive overlapping of the self with the other (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, Aron, Tudor, 
& Nelson, 1991; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & 
Neuberg, 1997). That there is cognitive overlapping between the self and the other 
suggests that identity concerns are at least partially responsible for motivating helping 
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behavior. Thus, in contrast to the altruism approach to the effects of empathy which 
suggests that helping is due to a selfless concern for others, the social identity approach is 
grounded in the idea that the emotion of empathy may be associated with a fundamental 
cognitive confusion between the self and the other (Wegner, 1980) which results in 
perceptions of shared category membership. Presumably, a consequence of this confusion 
is that the suffering of others becomes, in essence, the suffering of the perceiver. 
That helping behavior may be inextricably intertwined with perceptions of shared 
category membership is a possibility that is reinforced by research suggesting that 
ostracism, social exclusion, and rejection are causally linked to a reduction of prosocial 
behaviors (Williams, 2007). Experimental manipulations of social rejection and exclusion 
(i.e., the removal of social bonds) have been shown to significantly decrease prosocial 
behavior across a variety of domains, an effect which is mediated by decreases in 
empathy towards those in need (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 
2007). Moreover, other researchers point to the fact that humans are sometimes motivated 
by more biological or evolutionary mechanisms to help those who are the most closely 
related to themselves (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). In particular, the decision 
of who to help is sensitive to the larger social context. In life-or-death circumstances, for 
example, the decision of who to help is dominated by heuristic processes that include 
inclusive-fitness considerations: People are more likely to help those who are related or 
close to them. In more everyday contexts, however, other elements that require more 
cognitive elaboration (e.g., what is moral) come into play in deciding to help (Burnstein, 
et al., 1994).  
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 In response to explanations of the empathy-helping relationship that are based on 
social identity, Batson and his colleagues argue that empathy, by definition, requires 
awareness of another’s distinctiveness from the self, and that the effects of empathy 
manipulations on helping behavior are not bounded by the group membership of the 
perceiver (Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, & Dawson, 1997). More 
fundamentally, it has been suggested that the studies supporting the group 
identification/perceived similarity/self-overlap explanations contain a number of 
methodological confounds (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005). Specifically, 
variables in these studies that were not statistically controlled (the degree of personal 
contact between perceiver and target, the degree of personal relevance of the target’s 
need to the perceiver, the extent to which the goals of the perceiver and target were 
interdependent, and the extent to which the perceiver anticipated future interaction with 
the target) could all lead to perceived similarity independently of the empathy 
manipulation. Instead of perceived similarity, Batson and colleagues suggest that 
―nurturance,‖ as an altruistic impulse, is a more tenable explanation for the effects of 
empathy manipulations on helping behavior (Batson, et al., 2005).  
The nurturant tendencies hypothesis rests upon three assumptions. First, empathy 
is assumed to be an integral part of the human impulse to care for and protect one’s 
young. Second, humans are capable of generalizing this impulse to non-genetically-
related others. Finally, the extent to which the impulse generalizes to non-genetically-
related others varies. It was hypothesized that the effects of empathy would be stronger 
for targets who were more childlike, more vulnerable, and/or who needed protection. 
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Thus, to the extent that individuals feel empathy based out of a sense of altruistic 
nurturance, they should report the most empathy for targets that are relatively helpless. 
To the extent that individuals feel empathy based on a sense of similarity, however, they 
should report the most empathy for the target with which they are the most similar.  In a 
particularly ingenious test of these ideas, Batson and his colleagues manipulated 
perceived similarity by having four levels of the target of empathy. Specifically, ―Kayla‖ 
was described as a student, as a dog, as a puppy, or as a child. Results indicated that 
participants were more likely to report stronger empathic concern for dissimilar targets 
(the dog, puppy, and child) than they reported for the similar student target (Batson, et al., 
2005). That the empathy-helping relationship was the weakest for the similar target 
contradicts perceived similarity explanations which suggest that empathic concern should 
be the strongest for the targets that are perceived to be the most similar to the perceiver.   
Hybrid Alternatives 
Some researchers have suggested that the altruism-egoism dichotomy is false (or 
misleading), and that altruism is best defined as a continuum that is defined by how much 
an individual intends to help another relative to what that individual expects to gain for 
his or her self (Krebs, 1991). Others contend that describing the effects of perspective 
taking as purely affective (i.e., only empathy arousing) is too narrow, and that there are 
also cognitive processes at play, some of which are likely to involve considerations of 
self-other similarity (Eisenberg, 1991; Davis, et al., 1996). According to approaches such 
as these, perspective taking involves cognitively understanding another’s experience, and 
empathy is the emotional response that results.  Indeed, as mentioned previously, which 
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approach (i.e., affective/altruistic vs. affective and cognitive/egoistic) is a more accurate 
account of the empathy-helping relationship may be irresolvable. In any case, the ability 
to entertain the psychological perspective of another person has been shown to result in 
some outcome (altruism or less egoism) which has been shown to elevate the interest in 
another person, relative to one’s own self-interest.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GROUP-LEVEL EMPATHY 
Whereas previous research has indicated that group-level emotions exist, and that 
specific group emotions such as anger and contempt are useful in explaining group-level 
offensive action tendencies against out-groups (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 
Seger, & Mackie, 2007), less is known about positively valenced group-level emotions 
that may explain prosocial actions towards out-groups (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, 
Jorge, & Lewis, 2008). Whether empathy exists at the group level in the altruistic (i.e., 
selfless) sense is of particular concern to the prosocial behavior literature generally, and 
the intergroup justice literature in particular. There is reason to doubt the existence of 
intergroup empathy, however. Previous research of this question has suggested that 
dispositional empathy predicts in-group helping behavior, but interpersonal attraction 
predicts out-group helping behavior (Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005).  
Moreover, researchers have demonstrated that even in a minimal group paradigm, 
empathy is actually deactivated for out-groups (Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Seim, 2006). 
These researchers suggest that it is not the case that people only help in-group members 
and never help out-group members; rather, they suggest that the motivation for helping in 
each context is different.  
Specifically, whereas the motivation to help in-group members is due to socio-
cognitive phenomena that result in self-other overlap (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, et 
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al., 1987), helping out-groups is likely to be motivated by more systematic cost-benefit 
analyses, and is therefore less likely in a general sense.  
Some positive effects of empathy inductions on overall attitudes towards out-
groups has been documented in previous literature, however (Batson, et al., 1997a; 
Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). In the evaluative domain, participants that are 
instructed to take the perspective of an out-group member indicate an increased valuing 
of that person’s welfare. If group membership is salient, this valuing of the out-group 
member’s welfare translates to more favorable evaluations of the group to which the 
target belongs. Importantly, this is the case irrespective of the extent to which stereotypes 
about the relevant out-groups are privately endorsed by perceivers (Vescio, et al., 2003). 
In the domain of justice behaviors, taking the perspective of a single out-group member 
has been shown to predict monetary allocations to out-groups as a whole (Batson, Chang, 
Orr, & Rowland, 2002). Thus, there is evidence that individuals can be influenced via 
empathy manipulations to have more positive evaluations of out-groups, and that such 
positive evaluations can generalize to increased financial support of out-group causes. It 
remains to be seen, however, whether or not these effects can be interpreted as the result 
of truly group-level empathy or whether such positive evaluations and allocations are 
artifacts of the individual-level empathy felt for the target out-group member.  
 Despite these potential benefits, sometimes perspective taking can backfire in 
intergroup contexts. Specifically, efforts to appreciate an out-group’s point of view can 
lead individuals to think about how the relevant out-group perceives the individual’s own 
in-group, a phenomenon known as meta-stereotyping (Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki, 
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2009). In this particular study, participants low in prejudice evidenced less favorable 
behavior towards ethnic out-groups if they were instructed to first take the perspective of 
an out-group member—a result that stands in stark contrast to those of previous studies 
(c.f. Batson, et al., 1997a; Vescio, et al., 2003).  Presumably, taking the perspective of an 
out-group member led participants low in prejudice to consider the possibility that the 
out-group may have perceived the in-group as highly prejudiced (i.e., a meta-stereotype 
of one’s own in-group). The researchers argued that such meta-stereotyping elicited a 
sense of in-group threat in low prejudiced participants, which then resulted in lower 
ratings of out-groups than was the case for participants high in prejudice who also took 
the perspective of an out-group member. The study by Vorauer and colleagues is 
important to the present investigation because it suggests that the potential benefits to 
out-groups as a result of perspective taking do not hold in all circumstances. Although the 
moderator of the effect of perspective taking in the Vorauer study was an individual 
difference variable (i.e., prejudice), there are likely to be many moderators of such 
effects. One class of variables likely to affect the strength of perspective-taking 
manipulations are those that refer to the out-group itself. Are there characteristics of out-
groups that may lead to stronger (versus weaker) empathy effects on helping behavior?  
Fortuitously, a theoretical framework for investigating questions such as these already 
exists in the form of the group stereotypes literature. This literature both describes the 
different dimensions along which individuals evaluate out-groups, as well as explains the 
functions such evaluations fulfill.  
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Group Stereotypes 
 The potential relationships between justice, empathy, and group stereotypes are 
well demonstrated by a recent study suggesting that priming participants with specific 
group stereotypes (e.g., black criminals, promiscuous black females) reduces policy 
support for black evacuees of hurricane Katrina and black pregnant women in need, but 
does not influence responses towards white targets in the same circumstances (Johnson, 
Olivo, Gibson, Reed, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2009). Importantly, the interactive effect found 
by these researchers was mediated by perceived empathy towards the targets in need: 
Primed participants did not report significant levels of empathic concern for black targets. 
Johnson and colleagues (2009) measured empathy as an outcome variable, but did not 
include a perspective-taking manipulation. The omission of a perspective-taking 
manipulation in the Johnson study is important because previous literature has shown that 
taking the perspective of another negates the impact of privately held negative 
stereotypes on the evaluations of out-groups (Vescio, et al., 2003). Although both of 
these studies are provocative, they focus only on racial stereotypes. Thus, the extent to 
which their implications can be generalized across different kinds of groups is limited. 
However, substantial work has been done in the area of stereotypes about out-groups, and 
this work is singularly suited to shed light on the complex relationships between empathy 
and out-group helping behaviors.  
Stereotypes about out-groups are presumed to be important because they are 
functional: They allow for a sense of in-group prediction and control over potential 
external threats, and such group threats are presumed to be the motivational 
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underpinnings of discrimination and prejudice (Fiske, 2004). Some out-groups are likely 
to be perceived as threatening, whereas others are likely to be perceived as relatively 
harmless. All else being equal, individuals may be more likely to help a non-threatening 
out-group than they are to help an out-group that in some way threatens their own in-
group (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). A separate but related line of research has already 
suggested a similar set of relationships. Specifically, participants that believe they are 
powerful (as the result of an experimental manipulation) are more likely to frame social 
decision-making in terms of social responsibility, leading them to allocate more money to 
those who are described as powerless (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De 
Dreu, 2008). Importantly, this finding was explained in terms of empathic concern of the 
powerful towards the powerless. To the extent that powerless groups can be even 
partially equated with non-threatening groups, the research by Handgraaf and colleagues 
(2008) seems particularly relevant to the present research.  
 The stereotype content model of group stereotypes has been used to hypothesize 
about similar effects of the concept of threat as it applies to out-groups. This model grew 
out of a need to expand research on stereotype content from a single evaluative 
dimension (good vs. bad) to include the reality that out-group stereotype content can be 
(and often is) ambivalent (Fiske, 2004; Claussel & Fiske, 2005). The theoretical 
underpinnings of the model suggest that when encountering out-groups, perceivers have 
two primary needs to fulfill. First, perceivers want to know what the intentions of out-
groups are towards the in-group (perceived warmth); second, after intentions are known, 
perceivers are interested in whether or not the out-group has the power to effect their 
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intentions (perceived competence) (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). The model further 
postulates that the content of group stereotypes depends upon the status ascribed to out-
groups (which predicts competence) and the extent to which out-groups are perceived to 
be competitive (which predicts lack of warmth or coldness). Crossing perceived warmth 
with perceived competence results in four quadrants within which groups can be 
categorized: warm-competent, warm-incompetent, cold-competent, and cold-incompetent 
(Fiske, et al., 2002). According to this framework, out-groups perceived to be warm and 
incompetent are the least threatening, whereas out-groups perceived to be cold and 
competent are the most threatening (Fiske, et al., 2002).  
The warmth and competence dimensions that are outlined by the stereotype 
content model have been found to predict specific behavioral tendencies towards out-
groups (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Specifically, 
this research suggests that behavioral tendencies towards out-groups are determined 
along two major dimensions. The first dimension represents intensity of effort: Behaviors 
are either active (i.e., effortful behaviors that directly affect the target group) or they are 
passive (i.e., less effortful behaviors that still have consequences for the target group). 
The second dimension represents valence: Behaviors either facilitate (by actively helping 
or passively associating with) the target group, or they harm (by actively harassing or 
passively neglecting) the target group. A conceptual crossing of these two dimensions 
results in four specific types of out-groups that elicit more specific behavioral tendencies. 
Admired groups are perceived as warm and competent and elicit association and help; 
hated groups are perceived as cold and incompetent and elicit harassment and neglect; 
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envied groups are perceived as cold and competent and elicit association but also 
harassment; finally, pitied groups are perceived to be warm and incompetent and elicit 
help but also neglect (Cuddy, et al., 2007). The research just outlined does not include 
empathy as a consideration. In fact, no research to date has investigated the empathy-
helping behavior relationship in the context of the stereotype content model. The existing 
research does suggest, however, that the empathy-helping behavior relationship is likely 
to be stronger for certain kinds of out-groups than it is for others.  
Consideration of the preceding section suggests the potential to address a current 
weakness of the empathy-helping behavior literature. Specifically, helping behavior has 
been measured as a binary outcome in most investigations (i.e., help versus no help 
choices). Rather than a threatening out-group eliciting zero helping behavior from a 
perceiver, it is possible that such groups will receive less help than non-threatening 
groups will receive. Helping behaviors that require substantial effort and/or a high level 
of trust from helpers (i.e., hosting an out-group member in one’s home), for example, are 
probably extremely unlikely if the stereotype of the out-group indicates threat. In 
contrast, helping behaviors that are less effortful and/or require less trust (i.e., a one-time 
only donation of funds to an out-group cause) may be more likely in threatening 
situations. It is important to demonstrate, from an empathy-helping behavior perspective, 
whether such variations in types of helping behaviors exist. If so, it is important to 
document whether such variations are functions of specific characteristics of out-groups 
(e.g., those that are indicative of threat).   
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More fundamentally, another weakness of the empathy-helping behavior literature 
is that studies which have suggested that empathy does not apply to out-groups have not 
manipulated empathic concern, via variations in perspective-taking instructions, at a truly 
group level. Rather, the limited research that has investigated group-level effects of 
empathy manipulations has relied exclusively upon perspective-taking instructions that 
lead participants to consider the perspective of a single target person, and have then 
measured evaluations of the target’s group and/or monetary allocations to the target 
group’s cause. No research to date, however, has instructed participants to consider the 
perspective of the out-group as a whole. If it is to be argued that the benefits of empathy 
do or do not extend to the group level, it must first be demonstrated that experimental 
manipulations that result in variations in empathic concern (i.e., perspective taking) can 
be effectively operationalized at the group level.   
Summary 
 The overarching goal of the current research is to investigate whether or not 
empathic concern can motivate justice behaviors that benefit out-groups. The preceding 
sections have thus reviewed the major insights offered into this question by three separate 
(but related) social-psychological literatures: social justice, prosocial behavior motivated 
by empathy, and group stereotypes. With very few exceptions, a review of the social 
justice literature suggests that justice concerns simply do not apply to out-groups. Rather, 
this literature suggests that the very definition of justice appears to be bounded by notions 
of shared category membership. Thus, if the goal is to concern perceivers with the plight 
of out-groups, the prevailing wisdom of the justice literature is that it may be necessary to 
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make direct (or indirect) appeals to a sense of superordinate identity. To the extent that 
these appeals are successful, the effect of superordinate identification should be to 
dissolve the intergroup distinction and transform thoughts of ―Us vs. Them‖ to thoughts 
of a more inclusive ―Us.‖  
 A review of the prosocial literature, however, may suggest a slightly different 
picture. Although there seems to be agreement within this literature that empathy, as an 
affective construct, is deactivated for out-groups as a whole, there is evidence suggesting 
that taking the perspective of an out-group member can result in empathic concern for 
that individual, which then results in increased monetary allocations to the target 
individual’s group (i.e., an out-group) (Batson, et al., 2002). Since allocations to groups 
are distributive justice behaviors, and since the existence of an ―out-group cause‖ implies 
that the intergroup distinction remains more or less intact, the prosocial literature 
suggests that at least some justice behavior can in fact be extended to out-groups, and that 
it is at least possible that such behavior may be inter- rather than intra-group in nature. 
However, because the perspective-taking instructions in all of the existing studies instruct 
individuals to consider the situation of a single individual rather than the situation of a 
group as a whole, it is impossible to argue that benefits to the target’s group reflect 
intergroup phenomena.  
Finally, a review of the out-group stereotyping literature suggests that even if 
empathic concern does exist for out-groups, the relative magnitude of such concern is 
likely to vary according to the specific characteristics (i.e., stereotypes) that are 
associated with a particular group. For example, the stereotype content model suggests 
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that when individuals encounter an out-group, they are primarily interested in divining 
the answers to two questions (Cuddy, et al., 2007). First, individuals want to know the 
out-group’s intention toward their own in-group: Is this group warm or cold? Second, 
individuals want to know if the out-group can effect its intention towards their in-group: 
Is this group competent or incompetent? To the extent that an out-group is considered to 
be cold and competent, that group is considered to be threatening to one’s in-group 
position. That empathic concern for these types of groups would motivate helping 
behavior is indeed unlikely. A warm and incompetent group, however, is not threatening 
to the in-group, so empathic concern towards such groups (if it exists), may be more 
likely to motivate helping behavior. Indeed, previous work has shown that whether or not 
individuals extend helping behaviors to out-groups depends on the different stereotypes 
associated with those groups (Cuddy, et al., 2007). It remains to be seen what motivates 
this behavior, because the group stereotypes literature is, for the moment, absent any 
mention of the possible role of empathy. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether these 
effects of group stereotypes would persist in the context of actively taking the perspective 
of an out-group. This question is important because previous research indicates that one 
effect of perspective taking is to negate or mitigate the impact of privately held 
stereotypes on the evaluations of out-groups (Vescio, et al., 2003). If perspective taking 
negates or mitigates the impact of negative stereotypes, then it is possible that people can 
be motivated to help out-groups—even if they are threatening to the in-group.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 The purpose of the present research is to examine what variables may lead 
individuals to extend helping behaviors, both justice-related and non-justice-related, to 
out-groups. Despite the fact that the review of the justice literature indicates that such 
considerations and behaviors do not apply to out-groups, the empathy-helping behavior 
literature suggests that actively taking the perspective of a target individual can lead to 
evaluations and allocation behaviors that benefit that target individual’s group. 
Perspective taking as an experimental manipulation has additional value in that it is able 
to be operationalized at various levels. The research that has used perspective taking to 
induce empathic concern for others has compared two levels of perspective-taking 
instructions: instructions to remain objective to the plight of the target person (i.e., 
objective conditions), and instructions to consider the plight of the target person carefully 
(i.e., individual empathy conditions). Across multiple studies and multiple contexts, 
individuals in empathy conditions have been found to extend more helping behavior to 
individuals in need than to individuals in objective conditions—and some of these 
benefits have been successfully applied to the groups to which the targets belonged. 
The first major aim of the current study will be to add two more levels to 
perspective-taking instructions with an eye to further theory and understanding about out-
group justice behaviors. Previous research that has suggested that empathy-motivated 
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helping is deactivated for out-groups has not manipulated empathy at the group level 
(Stürmer, et al., 2006). The present research will attempt to address this weakness of the 
literature by explicitly making the target of the perspective taking a group rather than an 
individual. Group-level perspective taking will be operationalized in two different ways 
that are relevant for a group-level analysis. First, ―out-group empathy‖ conditions will 
use a set of perspective-taking instructions that ask participants to consider the plight of 
the target group as a whole, leaving the explicit intergroup distinction intact. Second, 
―superordinate empathy‖ conditions will use a set of perspective-taking instructions that 
ask participants to consider the plight of the target group as a whole, but will include a 
direct appeal to a superordinate level of identification with the perceiver. Differences in 
levels of empathic concern that are indicated between these two new conditions should be 
able to be interpreted as inter- versus intra-group experiences of empathy.  
As indicated previously, the review of the group stereotypes literature suggests 
that even if group perspective taking elicits empathy for the out-group, the level of 
empathic concern may vary depending on specific stereotypes about the out-group. The 
second major aim of the current study is to investigate this possibility directly by 
integrating the group stereotype literature with the empathy-helping behavior literature. 
Specifically, the current investigation will manipulate the two dimensions of the 
stereotype content model, warmth and competence, to create four separate types of out-
groups: warm and competent groups, cold and competent groups, warm and incompetent 
groups, and cold and incompetent groups. To the extent that the four levels of 
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perspective-taking instructions (i.e., individual objective, individual empathy, group 
empathy, and superordinate empathy) interact with the dimensions of the stereotype 
content model, the levels of perspective taking should have different implications for out-
group helping behavior depending on the type of out-group that is relevant.  
Whereas research that has investigated helping behavior as the result of empathy 
manipulations is vast, all of this research has operationalized helping in terms of either 
help versus no help choices or in terms of differences in the extent to which individuals 
report intentions to engage in a single helping behavior. That is, the existing literature 
seems to treat helping behavior as a unitary construct (but see Cuddy, et al, 2007). 
Helping behavior, however, should correspond to at least two dimensions. First, helping 
behaviors should vary according to the extent to which they require effort on the part of 
the helper. Second, helping behaviors should vary according to the extent to which they 
require helpers to trust the individuals (or groups) they wish to help. A third aim of the 
present research, therefore, is to create and utilize dependent measures of helping 
behaviors that correspond to the dimensions of effort and trust. In addition, helping 
behavior items reflecting a concern for procedural justice will be created and included as 
a separate dependent measure for the main study.  
A final goal of the present study will be to investigate the mediational process 
through which perspective taking influences willingness to engage in helping behaviors. 
It is likely that potential mediators of this relationship will vary among the different 
empathy conditions. On one end of the levels of empathy, the results for individual 
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empathy conditions should replicate those of previous research. That is, participants in 
individual empathy conditions should experience empathic concern for the target out-
group member, and this concern should mediate the relationship between perspective 
taking and helping behavior. The literature suggests that it is also possible that the extent 
to which participants in individual empathy conditions experience a cognitive 
overlapping of themselves with the target individual will also occur as a result of the 
empathy manipulation. Thus, the potential for self-other overlap to mediate the 
relationship between perspective taking and helping behavior will also be investigated.  
On the other end of the levels of empathy, the nature of superordinate 
identification is such that it emphasizes a common identity. Thus, individuals in 
superordinate conditions should indicate that they are more likely to engage in helping 
behaviors toward the out-group relative to those participants in the control conditions 
(i.e., individual objective conditions), because the superordinate manipulation should 
influence perceivers to view the targets as new members of their own in-group. If this is 
indeed the case, then the relationship between perspective taking and helping behavior 
for participants in superordinate conditions should be mediated by the extent to which 
participants feel that they share a common identity with the relevant group. In contrast, 
participants in out-group empathy conditions should not indicate particularly high levels 
of a shared identity with the out-group, because the subgroup distinction should remain 
intact. Instead, if perspective taking leads to increases in willingness to help in out-group 
empathy conditions, this relationship might be mediated either by the extent to which 
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participants experience empathic concern or the extent to which they experience a degree 
of cognitive overlap with the target, or some combination of both processes.   
The hypotheses for the superordinate and the out-group empathy conditions are 
both speculative. Previous research from within the empathy-helping behavior literature 
suggests that empathy is deactivated for out-groups (Stürmer, et al., 2006), and that 
helping towards out-groups is predicted by interpersonal attraction rather than intergroup 
empathy (Stürmer, et al., 2005). Thus, instructions to empathize with the out-group may 
not lead to increased willingness to help the out-group. Moreover, even if such 
instructions do lead to increases in out-group helping, such increases may not be 
motivated by empathy. These potentials for null effects should be considered in light of 
the fact that the research of Stürmer and his colleagues (2005, 2006) did not include 
perspective-taking instructions as an experimental manipulation of empathic concern.    
Thus, the present study will investigate the effects of four levels of perspective 
taking and four different out-group stereotypes on empathic concern for the targets of the 
perspective taking. In addition, the effects of empathic concern on participants’ 
willingness to engage in helping behaviors that vary according to effort and trust, as well 
as their willingness to engage in specific justice-related helping behaviors will also be 
investigated. Finally, if the above effects are found to be statistically significant, the 
present study will attempt to identify process mechanisms for the observed empathy-
helping relationships.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
HYPOTHESES 
Empathic Concern 
 The empathy literature indicates that careful consideration of the perspective of 
another individual leads to empathic concern for that individual, which, in turn, motivates 
helping behavior. In a first test of a group-level empathy hypothesis, it is hypothesized 
that instructions to take the perspective of a group as a whole (defined either as an 
explicit out-group or in terms of a superordinate level of identification) will lead to 
empathic concern which, in turn, should motivate helping behavior.  
Group Stereotypes 
Assuming that the above hypothesis is supported by the data, it is further 
hypothesized that the level of empathic concern experienced will depend on the specific 
stereotypes that are associated with the out-group. Because this study represents the first 
attempt to integrate the group stereotypes literature with the empathy-helping literature, it 
is in some sense exploratory. However, there are expectations for some general patterns 
of results. For example, groups associated with cold and incompetent stereotypes should 
elicit less empathic concern from perceivers than groups associated with warm and 
incompetent stereotypes.  
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Perspective Taking 
The main effect of group stereotypes is hypothesized to interact with the effect of 
the perspective-taking manipulation. That is, the effects of group stereotypes on levels of 
empathic concern may be different depending on the specific level of the perspective-
taking variable. Taking the perspective of a cold and incompetent out-group as a whole 
may lead to less empathic concern and therefore less helping than would taking the 
perspective of a single member of that out-group. Similarly, taking the perspective of a 
cold and incompetent out-group as a whole may lead to less empathic concern than would 
taking the perspective of such a group that is defined in terms of superordinate 
identification with the perceiver’s own in-group. Yet another possibility of the 
perspective-taking manipulation is that the empathy instructions (for individuals and 
groups) may effectively wipe out any influence that group stereotypes have on empathic 
concern. This possibility is suggested by previous research indicating that taking the 
perspective of a target individual wiped out the effects of negative racial stereotypes on 
evaluations of the target’s racial group (Vescio, et al., 2003).  
Willingness to Help 
Effort and Trust 
 It is hypothesized that increases in empathic concern, as a result of the empathy 
perspective-taking conditions, will be associated with increased willingness to engage in 
helping behaviors. However, the likelihood of helping out-groups is expected to be 
moderated by the nature of the helping behavior itself. Helping behaviors that require 
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minimal effort and/or trust, for example, may be more likely in general than are behaviors 
that require maximum effort and/or trust on the part of the helper. The effect of effort and 
trust may be further qualified by the effect of the stereotypes associated with the out-
group and the level of perspective-taking instructions. One manifestation of this three-
way interaction would be if helping behaviors that require substantial effort and trust are 
likely only for groups associated with warm and incompetent stereotypes that are also 
defined in terms of superordinate identification with the perceiver’s in-group.  
Justice 
 If individuals can be motivated via empathy to extend justice behaviors to out-
groups, then empathy perspective-taking instructions should lead to increased willingness 
to engage in justice-related helping behaviors compared with instructions to remain 
objective. This is especially likely in the superordinate empathy conditions, as the justice 
literature specifies that justice concerns are extended only to those who share a common 
identity with the perceiver. The results of the analyses of the justice behaviors for the 
group empathy conditions are of particular interest to the current investigation. If, as the 
justice literature suggests, individuals do not consider out-groups in terms of justice, then 
there should be no effect of the group empathy manipulation on willingness to engage in 
justice-related helping behaviors. However, the empathy literature has already shown that 
individuals can be influenced by empathy manipulations to allocate financial resources 
(i.e., a distributive justice behavior) to out-groups. Because this research instructed 
participants to consider the feelings of a single out-group member, however, it remains 
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unclear whether the increase in allocation is a result of group-level empathy or an artifact 
of the empathy felt for the single target member.  If benefits for the out-group are due to 
the empathy felt for the single target member, then such benefits should not be observed 
in conditions which instruct participants to consider the feelings of the out-group as a 
whole. However, if benefits for the out-group are at least partially related to group-level 
empathy, then such benefits to out-groups in these conditions should remain intact.  
 It should be mentioned that the degree to which the empathy manipulations will 
lead to helping and/or justice behavior will likely vary depending on the out-group 
stereotype manipulation. Those groups that are seen as particularly vulnerable, for 
example, may receive the greatest degree of benefit whereas those seen as cold and 
competent may receive the least benefit, regardless of the empathy manipulation. These 
possibilities have not been directly investigated in previous research, so they are 
speculative until such time as the data can provide more solid conclusions. 
Mediation 
 If perspective taking and group stereotypes interact to predict increases in 
empathic concern, and if increases in empathic concern predict helping behavior, then the 
mediational mechanism underlying such effects is likely to be different depending on 
both the level of perspective-taking instructions (individual vs. out-group vs. 
superordinate), as well as the stereotypes associated with the particular out-group (warm-
competent vs. warm-incompetent vs. cold-competent vs. cold-incompetent). Thus, 
several tests of mediation will be conducted. The direct effect of perspective taking on 
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helping for participants in superordinate empathy conditions is expected to be mediated 
by group identification. For participants in individual and out-group empathy conditions, 
the direct effect of perspective taking on helping is expected to be mediated by either 
empathic concern, self-other overlap, or some combination of both. Assuming these 
relationships are supported by the data, additional analyses will be conducted within each 
of the perspective-taking conditions to see if the mediator of the relationship holds across 
the four categories of out-group stereotypes.  
Group Identification 
 The justice literature suggests that the likelihood that an individual will extend 
justice-related helping behaviors (i.e., allocations, collective action against injustice) is 
high only when the individual shares some level of category membership with a target. 
Thus, the effects of group stereotypes and perspective taking on helping behaviors for 
individuals in empathy conditions could be mediated by perceptions of group 
identification as measured by group/self similarity and group attraction variables (Prislin, 
Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). This is especially likely to be the case in superordinate 
empathy perspective-taking conditions.  
Self-Other Overlap 
 Whereas group identity refers to identification with a group as a whole, self-other 
overlap refers to identification with a single individual. Thus, the effects of group 
stereotypes and perspective taking on helping behaviors for participants in individual 
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empathy conditions could be mediated by self-other overlap (Aron & Aron, 1986) as well 
as empathic concern (see below).  
Empathic Concern 
 The empathy-altruism literature suggests that extending helping behavior is likely 
to the extent that an individual experiences empathic concern for the target. If so, then the 
effects of group stereotypes and perspective taking could be mediated by empathic 
concern instead of, or in addition to, self-other overlap. This pattern of results is expected 
for out-group empathy conditions, even though previous literature suggests that empathy 
is deactivated for out-groups. This pattern is also expected for individual empathy 
conditions.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
STUDY ONE 
 It is hypothesized that helping behaviors would correspond to at least two 
dimensions: the extent to which they required effort on the part of the helper, and the 
extent to which they required trust. Thus, the aim of study one was to generate two 
Guttman scales of helping behavior: one for effortful helping behaviors and one for 
helping behaviors that required trust. Twenty-two items were generated, six items 
represented behaviors requiring low effort, five items represented behaviors requiring 
high effort, five items represented behaviors requiring low levels of trust, and six items 
represented behaviors requiring high levels of trust (Questionnaire A).   
Method 
 Thirty undergraduate students (mean age = 22.43 years, SD = 6.78 years, 6 males) 
were asked to fill out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Of the participants, 17 (56.7%) 
identified themselves as Caucasian, 3 (10 %) identified themselves as African American 
or Black, 4 (13.3%) identified themselves as Asian, 5 (16.7%) identified themselves as 
Latino, and one participant (3.3%) indicated that he/she was from an ethnic background 
that was not listed as an option.  
Procedure 
Participants read that the study was investigating people’s perceptions of the 
degree to which various helpful behaviors towards out-group members required effort
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 and trust. They were asked to read a scenario that described a particular group, and then 
asked to evaluate various behaviors according to how much effort and trust they would 
each require on a scale from 1 (none) to 9 (a great deal). Regarding effort, participants 
read that ―effortful behaviors are those that require conscious and focused trying in 
pursuit of a goal. In the current context, effortful behaviors are those that require time 
and/or energy on the behalf of others.‖ Regarding trust, participants read that ―trusting 
behaviors are those that rely on the character, ability, and truth of another. In the current 
context, trust means that you would need to put faith in the character, ability, and truth of 
members of this group before you would engage in the behaviors.‖  
 Participants then read a paragraph describing the ―Wallonians,‖ a description 
adapted from Cuddy and colleagues (2007). The scenario read as follows:  
Due to political and economic circumstances, United States demographers are 
predicting waves of immigration in the next few years from an ethnic group 
outside of our borders that call themselves the Wallonians. Imagine that you are 
being asked to provide assistance to the Wallonians. Please read each of the 
behaviors listed below, and indicate how much effort and trust you think each 
behavior would require.  
 
 Following completion of the questionnaire, participants indicated their age, 
gender, and ethnicity. They were then thanked for their participation, debriefed as to the 
purpose of the study, and released.  
Results 
 Ratings of effort required were indexed into a single measure of effort (α = .88), 
and ratings of trust required were indexed into a single measure of trust (α = .91). A 
correlational analysis indicated that effort and trust were separate, but related, constructs 
48 
 
 
 
(r = .35, p = .06). Five items were selected for the effort scale based on the means and 
standard deviations of the effort ratings (Questionnaire B, part I). The five items for the 
effort scale were selected based on the relative magnitude of the mean effort required for 
each behavior, such that the first item represented the lowest effort and was given a 
weight of one and the last item represented the highest effort and was given a weight of 
five. Likewise, five separate items were selected for the trust scale based on the means 
and standard deviations of the trust ratings (Questionnaire B, part II). The five items for 
the trust scale were selected based on the relative magnitude of the mean level of trust 
required for each behavior such that the first item represented the least amount of trust 
required and the last item required the most trust (Table 1). 
Discussion 
 The purpose of the initial study was to demonstrate the utility of investigating 
helping behaviors that correspond to differential levels of effort and required trust. As 
was expected, results suggest that people are sensitive to different levels of effort and 
trust that are required when deciding to help. Thus, behaviors that require less effort and 
trust are likely to be observed more often than are behaviors that require maximum effort 
and trust.  
Main Study  
 Since the preliminary study suggested that people are sensitive to the extent to 
which helping behaviors require effort and trust, the next logical question (and the main 
question of this research) became clear: would individuals be willing to extend various 
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levels of effort and trust to help different types of out-groups? Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that out-groups that were described as socially cold and incompetent may 
benefit from helping behaviors on the low ends of the effort and trust scales, but would 
be less likely to benefit from behaviors that required maximum effort or trust. In contrast, 
it was expected that out-groups that were described as socially warm and incompetent 
would be more likely to benefit from helping behaviors that required a greater amount of 
effort and trust on the part of the helper.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Three hundred and thirty-two undergraduates (123 men, M age = 19.0 years, age 
range: 18-30 years) were recruited for the study and randomly assigned to conditions 
among a 4(perspective taking: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group 
empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: 
competent vs. incompetent)  between subjects design. Of the participants, 218 (65.7%) 
identified as Caucasian, nine (2.7%) identified as African American, 55 (16.6%) 
identified as Asian, 27 (8.1%) identified as Latino, eight (2.4%) identified as Middle 
Eastern, and 15 participants (4.5%) indicated that they identified with an ethnicity that 
was not included among the options. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they perceived their family to be immigrants to America on a 7-point scale from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much), M = 4.15, SD = 2.32.  
50 
 
 
 
Procedure 
 Participants arrived in the laboratory, and were asked to read and sign a consent to 
participate in research. Participants were then told that the research was part of a larger 
effort to get student input regarding American society’s reactions to groups of incoming 
immigrants. Next, participants were told that United States demographers were predicting 
waves of immigration in the next few years for an ethnic group that call themselves the 
Wallonians. A brief description of the Wallonians followed which contained the 
manipulation of out-group stereotypes (Cuddy et al., 2007). Specifically, participants in 
warm-competent conditions read that Wallonians are viewed by their native country as 
―competent, intelligent, socially warm, and good-natured.‖ Similarly, participants in 
warm-incompetent, cold-competent, and cold-incompetent conditions read that 
Wallonians are viewed by their native country as incompetent, unintelligent, socially 
warm, and good-natured; competent, intelligent, socially cold, and ill-natured; or 
incompetent, unintelligent, socially cold and ill-natured, respectively. After reading the 
description, participants read that several hundred Wallonians had already arrived in the 
United States, and that the purpose of the study was to assess student reactions to the 
experiences that Wallonians have had so far.  
 Next, the perspective-taking manipulation took place. Specifically, participants 
were instructed either to consider the experience of an individual Wallonian in the 
described scenario objectively (i.e., individual objective conditions), to consider the 
experience of an individual Wallonian carefully in terms of the impact that experience 
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had on his or her feelings and how it affected his or her life (i.e., individual empathy 
conditions), to consider the experience of a group of Wallonians as a whole carefully in 
terms of the impact it had on their feelings and how it affected their lives (i.e., out-group 
empathy conditions), or to consider the experience of a group of Wallonians as 
representatives of new Americans carefully in terms of the impact it had on their feelings 
and how it affected their lives (i.e., superordinate empathy conditions). Following this 
manipulation, participants read the following scenario (which they were told had been 
translated from the Wallonian’s native language) describing the experience of a group of 
Wallonians:  
My friends and I were traveling to see the sights downtown. We were not familiar 
with Chicago’s bus and train system, and we ended up getting off the train a few 
stops early. We decided to walk the remaining blocks to reach our destination, but 
we became extremely lost. We could not make sense of the city maps we had, 
because we were not familiar enough with English to understand many of the 
terms. We were quickly overwhelmed by the noise and activity level of the city, 
and we quickly became disoriented and confused. It was a very scary experience 
for us. How will we ever adjust to life in this city?  
 
 Immediately following this procedure, participants were given five minutes to 
describe the group they had read about and to write down any thoughts that they had in 
response to reading about the scenario. This procedure was meant to encourage the 
strengthening of the perspective-taking manipulation and the group-stereotype 
manipulation. Following the thought listings, participants were asked to respond to a 
series of questionnaires (see Questionnaires C-H in the Appendices) that measured the 
dependent variables of interest as well as several demographic variables.  
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Measures 
Manipulation Checks 
 Participants’ open-ended responses to the two thought listings were analyzed for 
content. Specifically, the responses were coded for the extent to which they reflected 
objectivity or empathy towards the Wallonians, and the extent to which they mention the 
stereotypes associated with the Wallonians.  
Empathic Concern 
 Empathic concern was measured with the scale used by Batson and colleagues in 
previous research (Batson, 1991, 1998; Batson, et al., 1986; Batson, et al., 2002; Batson, 
et al., 2007). Participants indicated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely) 
the extent to which they felt sympathetic, softhearted, compassionate, tender, and warm 
after reading about the experience of the Wallonians. Reliability of the empathy scale was 
assessed with the average inter-item correlation (r = .64), the average item total 
correlation (r = .83), and Cohen’s alpha (α = .91). Responses to these items were 
averaged into an index of empathic concern.  
Personal Distress 
 
Because some researchers in the prosocial literature suggest that personal distress, 
rather than empathic concern, mediates the perspective-taking helping-behavior 
relationship, this construct was also measured (Maner, et al., 2002). Participants indicated 
on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely) the extent to which they felt alarmed, 
troubled, distressed, upset, and disturbed after reading about the experience of the 
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Wallonians. Reliability of the distress scale was assessed with the average inter-item 
correlation (r = .66), the average item total correlation (r = .86), and Cohen’s alpha (α = 
.91). Responses to these items were averaged into an index of distress. 
Helping Behavior 
Helping behavior was measured with the scales developed in study one. 
Participants were asked to check the blanks that corresponded to behaviors that they 
would be willing to engage in. The first five items were arranged in ascending order of 
the degree of effort required to engage in the behavior. Specifically, participants indicated 
if they would be willing to hold a door open for Wallonians carrying heavy loads, give 
directions to Wallonians who were lost, invite Wallonians to a weekend barbeque at their 
home, organize a benefit picnic in their community for Wallonians, and speak up if they 
witnessed Wallonians being cheated by a shop keeper. For purposes of analysis, a total 
effort score was computed by adding the number of behaviors participants indicated they 
would engage in. The second five items were arranged in ascending order of the degree 
of trust required to engage in the behavior. Specifically, participants indicated if they 
were willing to read an informational flier describing the situation of Wallonians in 
America, donate $5.00 to help Wallonians orient to the city, participate in a parade or 
march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians, introduce Wallonians to their personal 
friends, and offer to host Wallonians in their homes for a month. For purposes of 
analysis, a total trust score was computed by adding the number of behaviors participants 
indicated they would engage in.  
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Procedural Justice-Helping Behaviors 
For the justice-related behaviors, participants indicated on a 10-point scale (0 = 
not at all and 9 = extremely) how willing they were to sign a petition in support of social 
policies that protect the rights of Wallonians, campaign for legislation designed to protect 
the rights of Wallonians, vote in support of policies designed to protect the rights of 
Wallonians, volunteer their time to raise money for a town hall meeting where 
Wallonians can express their concerns, support policies that take the perspective of 
Wallonians into account, support community decisions that haven’t considered the voices 
of the Wallonians (reverse scored), and support equal representation for Wallonians in 
community decision-making. Reliability of the procedural justice scale was assessed with 
the average inter-item correlation (r = .45), the average item total correlation (r = .73), 
and Cohen’s alpha (α = .85). Responses to these items were averaged into an index of 
procedural justice. 
Group Identification 
 Two measures of group identification, group/self similarity and group attraction, 
that have been used in several previous studies (Prislin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000; Prislin, 
Brewer, & Wilson, 2002; Prislin & Christensen, 2005; Jacobs, Christensen, & Prislin, 
2009) were adapted for use in the current investigation. Group/self similarity was 
measured by items that assessed on a 10-point scale (0 = not at all and 9 = extremely) the 
extent to which participants reported that the Wallonians were similar to them and to 
people who were important to them. The reliability of the scale was assessed with 
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Cohen’s alpha (α = .84); responses were averaged into an index of group/self similarity. 
Group attraction was measured by items that assessed on a 10-point scale (0 = not at all 
and 9 = extremely) the extent to which participants reported that they liked the 
Wallonians, would like to socialize with the Wallonians, would like to take a class with 
members of the Wallonians, would like to discuss other issues with the Wallonians, and 
would like to work on a long-term project with the Wallonians. Reliability of the group 
attraction was assessed with the average inter-item correlation (r = .66), the average item 
total correlation (r = .86), and Cohen’s alpha (α = .88). Responses to these items were 
averaged into an index of group attraction. Because group/self similarity and group 
attraction proved to be significantly correlated, r = .58, p < .001, only group attraction 
was chosen to be included in the main analyses as a measure of group identification. 
Cognitive Overlap 
 Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they perceived an 
overlapping between their personal identity and the Wallonians, their personal identity 
and Americans, and Americans and the Wallonians. Participants indicated each by 
choosing among various figures that were adapted from previous research (Aron & Aron, 
1986; Aron, et al., 1991). The figures display two circles; one circle represents the self 
whereas the other circle represents the other (Questionnaire I). There are seven versions 
of these figures within the measure, and the degree to which these circles overlap varies 
between versions. Responses to the self-other overlap were scored such that the figure 
representing zero self-other overlap was assigned a value of one and the figure 
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representing almost total overlap was assigned a value of seven. This measure has been 
used heavily in the past as an indication of the extent to which individuals experience 
cognitive overlap between themselves and another (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, et al., 
1991). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
 To test the efficacy of the perspective-taking manipulation, the three empathy 
conditions (i.e., individual, group, and superordinate) were aggregated into a single 
category for purposes of analysis. Immediately following the description of the event 
experienced by the Wallonians, participants were given an open-response question that 
asked them to list thoughts that came to mind while they were reading the scenario. The 
thought-listing task was meant to serve the dual purpose of reinforcing the perspective-
taking and group-stereotype manipulations as well to assess whether empathy and the 
group stereotypes were mentioned.  Participants’ responses were coded according to 
whether or not empathy was mentioned. Specifically, two independent coders analyzed 
the thought-listing task for whether stereotypes about social warmth and competence 
were mentioned, as well as whether responses indicated that participants felt empathy for 
the out-group. For all three variables (warmth, competence, and empathy), Cohen’s 
Kappa coefficients indicated acceptable inter-rater reliability (Kappa = .74, .69, and .90, 
respectively). A chi-square goodness of fit test indicated that whereas seven (8.5%) 
participants in objective conditions mentioned empathy, 79 (31.6%) participants in 
perspective-taking conditions mentioned empathy, a difference that is beyond chance 
levels, χ2 (1) = 17.11, p < .001. In addition, mean empathy levels reported for participants 
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in objective conditions (M = 4.16, SD = 1.36) were significantly lower than those of 
participants in the perspective-taking conditions (M = 4.52, SD = 1.20) t(329) = -2.31, p = 
.02. Taken together, these two analyses indicate that the empathy manipulation was 
successful overall. Comparisons within the perspective-taking conditions, however, did 
not indicate that there were different levels of empathy according to the level (i.e., 
individual, out-group, and superordinate) of perspective taking (all ps > .13).  
 To investigate the efficacy of group stereotypes about warmth, participant 
responses to the open-response item were coded according to whether or not statements 
about social warmth and coldness were mentioned. Inspection of these frequencies 
indicated that 37 (11.1%) of participants mentioned social warmth or coldness in their 
descriptions, indicating that the manipulation of group stereotypes about warmth was 
weaker than expected. The main analyses that will be discussed below, however, indicate 
some statistically significant effects of warmth stereotypes that suggest that these 
variables were manipulated successfully. Similarly, to investigate the efficacy of group 
stereotypes about competence, participant responses to the open-response item were 
coded according to whether or not competence, incompetence, intelligence, and 
ignorance were mentioned. Inspection of these frequencies indicated that 24 (7.2%) 
participants mentioned competence or incompetence in their descriptions, indicating a 
weaker manipulation than expected. As was the case for warmth stereotypes, however, 
the main analyses reported below indicate significant effects for stereotypes about 
competence that suggest that these variables were successfully manipulated.  
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Correlations 
 Correlations among variables are listed in Table 2. Results indicate that perceived 
overlap between participants and Wallonians significantly correlated with many of the 
study variables. First, as participants perceived greater overlap between themselves and 
Wallonians, they perceived greater overlap between Americans and Wallonians r = .48, p 
< .001. However, whereas self-Wallonian overlap was associated with increases in 
empathy for Wallonians (r = .29, p < .001), American-Wallonian overlap and self-
American overlap were not (rs = -.04 and -.10, ns, respectively). In addition, as 
participants perceived greater degrees of overlap between themselves and Wallonians, 
they indicated that they were more distressed (r = .14, p < .001), that they would exert 
more effort (r = .28, p < .001) and trust (r = .32, p < .001) to help Wallonians, that they 
were more willing to extend procedural justice considerations toward the Wallonians (r = 
.37, p < .001), and identified more with the Wallonians as a group (r = .44, p < .001). 
Perceptions of self-American overlap were negatively correlated with the extent to which 
participants perceived themselves and their families to be immigrants, r = -.14, p < .001. 
Inspection of a scatter plot of this relationship suggests that as perceptions of self-
American overlap increase, the perception of status as an immigrant decreases.  
 Finally, American-Wallonian overlap was significantly correlated with self-
American overlap (r = .28, p < .001), the effort and trust (both rs = .11, p < .05) 
participants would put in helping Wallonians, and the level of identification with the 
Wallonians (r = .15, p < .05).  
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 As participants’ perceptions of themselves and their families as immigrants to 
America increased, so did empathy for the Wallonians (r = .29, p < .001), trust in the 
Wallonians (r = .15, p < .001), willingness to extend procedural justice considerations 
toward the Wallonians (r = .25, p < .001), and identification with the Wallonians as a 
group (r = .21, p < .001).  
 Empathy was found to be significantly related to many of the study variables in 
addition to the overlap measure mentioned above. Specifically, as participants’ level of 
empathy for the Wallonians increased, so did their levels of distress (r = .25, p < .001), 
the effort (r = .35, p < .001) and trust (r = .43, p < .001) they would put into helping 
Wallonians, their willingness to extend procedural justice considerations to the 
Wallonians (r = .52, p < .001), and their level of identification with the Wallonians as a 
group (r = .50, p < .001). In addition, as participants indicated more distress, they were 
more likely to extend procedural justice considerations to the Wallonians, r = .15, p < 
.001.  
 The amount of effort participants were willing to expend in order to help 
Wallonians was also positively correlated to the amount of trust they were willing to 
place in the Wallonians (r = .59, p < .001), their reported willingness to extend 
procedural justice considerations to Wallonians (r = .46, p < .001), as well as with the 
level of identification with the Wallonians (r = .43, p < .001). The amount of trust 
participants were willing to place in the Wallonians was also positively correlated with 
willingness to extend procedural justice considerations (r = .60, p < .001) as well as 
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identification with the Wallonians (r = .50, p < .001). Finally, willingness to extend 
procedural justice considerations to Wallonians was positively associated with the extent 
to which participants identified with Wallonians as a group, r = .67, p < .001.  
Personal Distress 
 Responses to the personal distress index were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking 
instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. 
superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. 
incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the 
distress score as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 3. Results 
indicated a significant perspective-taking X competence interaction effect on responses to 
the distress index F(3, 316) = 2.77, p = .042. Subsequent simple effects tests within 
competence conditions revealed a main effect of perspective taking F(3, 166) = 4.59, p = 
.004. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) 
procedure indicated that when out-groups were described as competent, those in out-
group perspective-taking conditions (M = 3.05) and superordinate perspective-taking 
conditions (M = 3.0) experienced significantly more distress than participants in objective 
conditions (M = 2.10), t(83) = 3.28, p = .007 and t(83) = 3.10, p = .012, respectively. In 
addition, when out-groups were described as competent, there was a trend for those in 
individual empathy conditions to experience more distress than participants in objective 
conditions, t(82) = -2.50, p = .063 (see Figure 1). Participants that read about incompetent 
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groups experienced similar levels of distress across levels of perspective taking F(3, 158) 
= .95, ns.   
Because research has suggested that personal distress, rather than empathic 
concern, mediates the perspective-taking / helping-behavior relationship, the effect of 
personal distress on willingness to engage in helping behaviors was assessed with 
regression analyses. Results indicated that distress did not predict willingness to engage 
in effortful helping behaviors (B = .05, SE = .04, p = .144). In contrast, distress did 
significantly predict willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required trust (B = 
.13, SE = .05, p = .007). This latter result indicates that increases in personal distress are 
associated with increases in the willingness to trust an out-group. Thus, subsequent 
analyses that will investigate the effect of the empathy manipulation on intentions to 
engage in helping that requires trust will be statistically controlled for the influence of 
personal distress.  
Empathic Concern 
 Responses to the empathy index were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking 
instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. 
superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. 
incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the 
empathy as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 4.  Results indicated a 
marginally significant effect of perspective-taking conditions F(3, 315) = 2.56, p = .055. 
Because there was a specific interest in the effect of the different levels of the 
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perspective-taking manipulation, Dunnett’s test was used as a post-hoc procedure that 
compared responses of participants in each of the three empathy perspective-taking 
conditions with responses of participants in objective conditions. The results of the 
Dunnett’s test indicated that participants in superordinate empathy conditions (M = 4.70, 
SD = 1.12) reported significantly higher levels of empathy than participants in objective 
conditions (M = 4.16, SD = 1.36), t(163) = 2.76, p = .017. No other effects were 
significant in this analysis. 
Helping Behavior 
 The effects of the independent variables on three separate types of helping 
behaviors (those requiring effort, those requiring trust, and those that were justice related) 
were investigated. 
Behaviors Requiring Effort 
 Responses to the effortful helping scale were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking 
instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. 
superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. 
incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations of the 
effortful helping score as a function of experimental condition are listed in Table 5. A 
main effect of competence indicated that participants were more likely to expend effort to 
help competent groups (M = 3.52, SD = .92) than they were to help incompetent groups 
(M = 3.31, SD = .93), F(1, 316) = 4.22, p = .041.  
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This effect of competence was qualified by a significant perspective taking X 
warmth X competence interaction, F(3, 316) = 2.65, p = .049. Simple effects tests within 
warmth conditions revealed a competence X perspective-taking interaction effect only 
within cold conditions, F(1, 316) = 3.12, p = .03. Subsequent decomposition of this effect 
revealed that there was no effect of perspective-taking instructions on the level of effort 
participants were willing to expend for cold and competent groups F(3, 316) = 1.24, p = 
.31. For cold and incompetent groups, however, the results of a Dunnett’s test indicated 
that participants in objective conditions (M = 3.65, SD = .99) showed significantly more 
willingness to put effort into helping than did individuals in out-group empathy 
conditions (M = 2.95, SD = 1.0), t(316) = -2.38, p = .052 (see Figure 2).  
Behaviors Requiring Trust 
 Responses to the trustful helping scale were subjected to a 4(perspective-taking 
instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-group empathy vs. 
superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: competence vs. 
incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with personal distress added as a 
covariate. Means and standard deviations of the trustful helping score as a function of 
experimental condition are listed in Table 6. Inspection of the results revealed only one 
marginally significant finding. Specifically, there was a trend for participants to be more 
likely to engage in behaviors requiring trust for groups described as competent (M = 2.78, 
SD = 1.19) than as incompetent (M = 2.56, SD = 1.26), F(1, 316) = 2.71, p = .10.  
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Justice-Related Behaviors 
 Responses to the procedural justice-helping behaviors were subjected to a 
4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-
group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: 
competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard 
deviations of the procedural justice score as a function of experimental condition are 
listed in Table 7. Results indicated no effect of either of the independent variables on the 
procedural justice index.  
Group Identification 
 Responses to the measure of group identification were subjected to a 
4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-
group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: 
competence vs. incompetence) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Means and standard 
deviations of the procedural justice score as a function of experimental condition are 
listed in Table 8. Results indicated a main effect of warmth such that participants 
identified significantly more with groups that were described as warm (M = 6.14, SD = 
1.35) than with those described as cold (M = 5.82, SD = 1.58), F(1, 316) = 4.06, p = .045. 
No other effect was significant in this analysis.  
Cognitive Overlap 
 Responses to all three measures of self-other overlap were subjected to 
4(perspective-taking instructions: individual objective vs. individual empathy vs. out-
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group empathy vs. superordinate empathy) X 2(warmth: warm vs. cold) X 2(competence: 
competence vs. incompetence) analyses of variance (ANOVA).  
Self-Wallonian Overlap 
Means and standard deviations of perceptions of cognitive overlap between the 
participants and the Wallonians are listed in Table 9. Results indicated a main effect of 
warmth such that participants perceived significantly more cognitive overlap between 
themselves and warm groups (M = 3.38, SD = 1.42) than they did between themselves 
and cold groups (M = 3.09, SD = 1.42), F(1, 316) = 3.78, p = .053. In addition, there was 
a main effect of competence such that participants perceived significantly more cognitive 
overlap between themselves and competent groups (M = 3.44, SD = 1.43) than they did 
between themselves and incompetent groups (M = 3.01, SD = 1.42), F(1, 316) = 7.80, p = 
.006. No other effects were statistically significant in these analyses.  
Self-American Overlap 
Means and standard deviations of perceptions of cognitive overlap between the 
participants and Americans are listed in Table 10. Results indicated no effect of the 
independent variables on perceptions of cognitive overlap between participants and 
Americans.  
American-Wallonian Overlap 
 Means and standard deviations of participants’ perceptions of cognitive overlap 
between Americans and Wallonians are listed in Table 11. Results indicated a marginal 
effect of perspective taking such that participants who were instructed to empathize with 
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the Wallonians as a group indicated slightly weaker perceptions of American-Wallonian 
overlap (M = 2.64, SD = 1.27) than did participants who were instructed to be objective 
(M = 3.10, SD = 1.45), t(316) = -2.05, p = .10. Results also indicated a main effect of 
competence such that participants who believed that the Wallonians were competent 
indicated significantly higher perceptions of American-Wallonian overlap (M = 3.14, SD 
= 1.45) than did participants who believed that the Wallonians were incompetent (M = 
2.83, SD = 1.42), F(1, 316) = 3.84, p = .051. No other effects were statistically significant 
in these analyses.  
Empathic Concern and Helping Behavior Relationship 
 Two separate regression equations investigated the direct effect of empathic 
concern on willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required effort and trust, 
respectively. With regard to effort, analysis indicated that increases in empathic concern 
were significantly related to increases in willingness to extend helping behaviors that 
required effort, (B = .245, SE = .038) t(329) = 6.66, p < .001. Analysis also indicated that, 
controlling for personal distress, increases in empathic concern were significantly related 
to increases in willingness to extend helping behaviors that required trust, (B = .419, SE = 
.049) t(329) = 8.55, p < .001. To investigate the nature of these effects, mediation 
analyses were conducted (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998; MacKinnon, 1994).  
Mediation 
The previous analysis of the effects of the independent variables on willingness to 
engage in helping behaviors that required effort revealed a perspective taking X warmth 
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X competence interaction effect. The decomposition of this effect by subsequent analyses 
indicated that it was the cold and incompetent out-groups in which there was a main 
effect of the perspective-taking manipulation. More specifically, for out-groups that were 
described as cold and incompetent, instructions to take the perspective of the out-group as 
a whole resulted in significantly less willingness to help than instructions to remain 
objective. Thus, for only those participants who read about socially cold and incompetent 
groups, three potential mediators of this effect (empathic concern, self-other overlap, and 
group identification) were investigated with the use of multiple regression analyses.  
Three dummy variables were created to represent the comparisons between the 
objective conditions and the three empathy conditions that were then entered into a 
regression equation predicting willingness to engage in helping behaviors that required 
trust. This analysis indicated that compared with instructions to remain objective, 
instructions to take the perspective of the out-group as a whole resulted in significant 
decreases in willingness to help (B = -.70, SE = .294) t(76) = -2.38, p = .02. To 
investigate whether empathic concern mediated the effect of perspective taking on 
helping, a second regression equation was created. These results revealed that taking the 
perspective of a cold and incompetent out-group as a whole resulted in a non-significant 
decrease in empathic concern (B = -.576, SE = .39), t(75) = -1. 48, p = .14. Thus, the 
second criterion for establishing mediation via empathic concern was not satisfied in 
these analyses. Analysis proceeded by investigating whether the direct effect of 
perspective taking on effortful helpful behaviors (for participants in cold and incompetent 
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conditions) was mediated by perceptions of self-other overlap or by perceptions of group 
identification. In both cases, the second criterion for mediation (i.e., that perspective 
taking influenced the mediator) was not established (B = -.50, SE = .47) t(76) = -1.06, p = 
.30 and (B = -.46, SE = .55) t(76) = -0.84, p = .40, respectively.  
The previous analyses of the effects of the independent variables on willingness to 
engage in helping behaviors that required trust revealed no statistically significant effects. 
Thus, potential mediators of the perspective-taking / helping-behavior relationship were 
not investigated further.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Knowledge of what types of groups are likely to receive help from other 
individuals, and under what conditions such help is motivated by empathic concern 
versus group identification versus self-other overlap is important for both the theoretical 
and applied social-psychological arenas. Most basically, the value of the research 
described here is that it represents a first step at integrating three separate areas of 
inquiry: social justice, prosocial behavior, and group stereotypes.  
A main purpose of the study was to see whether or not empathy could be elicited 
toward out-groups via a perspective-taking manipulation that instructed participants to 
take the perspective of an out-group as a whole. Results for these analyses revealed two 
noteworthy findings. First and foremost, this study failed to replicate the well-established 
finding that taking the perspective of an individual in need leads to increases in empathic 
concern compared with instructions to remain objective.  
That is, there was not a significant difference in levels of empathic concern 
between objective conditions and conditions which instructed participants to empathize 
with the individual describing the stressful event. It is a well-established finding in the 
empathy literature that empathy is deactivated for out-groups, but the individual empathy 
perspective-taking instructions asked participants to ―consider how the author of the 
description felt and how it affected his or her life.‖ These words were taken, verbatim, 
from previous research that has consistently found higher levels of empathy in 
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perspective-taking conditions relative to objective conditions (Batson, 1991, 1998; 
Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson, Bolen, Cross, & 
Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986; Batson, Dyck, Brandt, Batson, Powell, McMaster, & Griffitt, 
1988). What was it about the current study’s procedures that may have led to a non-
significant difference between individual empathy and objective conditions? 
 One element of this study that has differed from research on the empathy-helping 
behavior relationship is that even though the instructions to participants in individual 
empathy conditions were to focus on the individual, the target person was described, 
explicitly, as a member of an out-group. There has been at least one previous study, 
however, that has demonstrated that taking the perspective of a stigmatized out-group 
member results in empathic concern for that individual (Batson, et al., 2002). Batson’s 
study, however, focused on an out-group (convicted heroin dealers) that was stigmatized 
according to the norms and values of the participant’s own society. Because convicted 
heroin dealers are stigmatized sub-groups within a larger group (i.e., citizens of the 
United States), they are not the same kind of out-groups as are the out-groups in the 
current investigation (recent immigrants from another country). Thus, in the context of 
the empathy-helping behavior relationship, it could be the case that there are varying 
levels of distance from one’s own in-group by which out-groups can be conceptualized. If 
so, then it is a strong possibility that the value of perspective taking in eliciting empathy 
for representatives of out-groups will be sensitive to this level of distance between the 
perceiver and the out-group. Whereas the convicted heroin dealers in Batson’s research 
(Batson, et al., 2002) may have been conceptualized as a proximal out-group, the out-
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groups in the current investigation (recent immigrants from another country) may have 
been conceptualized as distal out-groups. Thus, the fact that the present study failed to 
replicate the well-documented finding that taking the perspective of an individual leads to 
increases in empathy for that individual may be because the individual in the current 
context was a member of a distal out-group. Future research will investigate this 
possibility further.  
Another possibility is the description of the actual event in the scenario. The 
current study differed from previous investigations of these phenomena because the 
description was of an event experienced by a group rather than by an individual. Thus, 
although the description was recounted by an individual, and although participants were 
instructed to consider the perspective of that individual while reading the description, the 
description itself referred to a group-level experience and not an individual one.  
The second noteworthy conclusion with regard to the empathy findings is 
interesting especially because of the immediately previous discussion about the 
deactivation of empathy for out-groups. Specifically, results indicated that the only 
perspective-taking condition that resulted in significantly higher levels of empathic 
concern than the objective condition was the one that explicitly instructed participants to 
think of the experience of the out-group from a perspective that stressed a superordinate 
level of identification. Once participants were interpreting the description of the group-
level event from a perspective that stressed an overarching identification with the out-
group, significantly higher levels of empathy were reported compared with those found in 
objective conditions. The lack of effects for the out-group perspective-taking condition 
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may be because considering how an out-group feels is very difficult for people to do 
cognitively. That is, participants may not have the cognitive capacity to empathize with 
anything other than an individual. Thus, empathizing with a group may simply not 
register as a conceivable option for participants. Overall, the results of the first test of the 
group-level empathy hypothesis suggest two possibilities. First, empathizing with an out-
group may require cognitive mechanisms that are different from those required to 
empathize with an individual, and therefore may require different instructions. The 
second possibility is that the mere suggestion of an out-group may deactivate empathic 
concern unless a specific appeal to an overarching identification with the out-group is 
made. Put differently, only when ―they‖ become ―us‖—or come closer to becoming 
―us‖—is empathy activated.  
A second major goal of the current study was to assess if the magnitude of 
empathy toward out-groups depended on specific stereotypes associated with those out-
groups. The stereotype content model (Fiske, et al., 2002; Fiske, 2004; Cuddy, et al., 
2007) has been used in the past to predict willingness to engage in helping behaviors 
towards groups, but had not been used in conjunction with empathy manipulations until 
the current investigation. The model, standing on its own, suggests that two variables 
influence willingness to engage in helping behavior: the extent to which groups are 
perceived as warm and the extent to which they are perceived as competent. The value of 
an integration of this literature with the empathy literature is in the fact that competence 
and warmth, as out-group stereotypes, are likely to affect the magnitude of empathic 
concern felt for groups. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants would feel 
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more empathy for out-groups that were described as socially warm and competent than 
they would for out-groups that were described as socially cold and incompetent.  
In terms of theoretical contribution to the research of the empathy-helping 
behavior relationship, the major implications of this research are to suggest, first, that 
empathy manipulations do not result in differences in helping behavior toward out-groups 
per se. Rather, the results of this study suggest that the empathy manipulations affect 
willingness to engage in helping behaviors that require effort but not those that require 
trust. The second theoretical implication of this research is the finding that, indeed, the 
effects of perspective taking on willingness to engage in helping behaviors that require 
effort depend on the specific stereotypes that are associated with the out-group. The 
nature of this finding, however, is much different than was expected.  
At a general level, it was hypothesized that without an empathy manipulation (i.e., 
in objective conditions), participants would be less likely to help groups that had 
undesirable characteristics (i.e., social coldness and incompetence). Further, it was 
hypothesized that instructions to empathize with groups described as socially cold and 
incompetent would lead to increases in helping behavior. Results indicated exactly the 
opposite. Specifically, participants who were instructed to empathize with socially cold 
and incompetent groups as a whole indicated significantly less willingness to engage in 
effortful helping behaviors compared with participants who were instructed to be 
objective. Although unexpected and counterintuitive, these findings suggest the 
possibility that thoughtful consideration of the perspective of a group that is socially cold 
and incompetent may lead to negative feelings that result in less helping. Even if 
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participants in objective conditions had these same negative feelings in response to 
reading about such groups, the instructions to be objective may have helped them to 
ignore the influence of those feelings when making decisions about helping.  
Another explanation converges  with recent research suggesting situations in 
which perspective taking is likely to backfire. For example, a field experiment that was 
conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (an area replete with intergroup conflict) 
investigated the effects of perspective taking on attitudes toward naturally occurring out-
groups. Results indicated that people who were exposed to the perspectives of out-groups 
indicated less tolerance of the out-group and were less likely to help them than if they had 
not been exposed to their perspectives (Paluck, 2010).  
Integrating the justice literature into this discussion is of value because resource 
allocation to out-groups (a distributive justice behavior) is, in fact, a helping behavior 
directed toward out-groups. As such, it was hypothesized that justice-related helping 
behaviors may also be sensitive to empathy and group-stereotype manipulations. 
Standing on its own, the justice literature suggests that in order for people to extend 
justice considerations to out-groups, there is a need to establish some sort of overarching 
common identity. Researchers studying prosocial behavior, however, have demonstrated 
that individuals can be motivated by empathic concern for an individual out-group 
member to allocate money (a distributive justice behavior) to that individual’s group. The 
research presented here attempted to extend those findings to the realm of procedural 
justice. On a purely descriptive level, it is interesting to note, first, that the correlation 
between empathy and willingness to extend procedural justice considerations to out-
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groups was significant and positive, indicating that increases in empathy are associated 
with an increase in the inclusion of out-groups into procedural justice reasoning (see 
Table 2). Second, the prevailing wisdom from within the social justice literature is that 
justice considerations apply only to individuals who share a common identity with the 
perceiver. If this were indeed the case, then one would expect participants in 
superordinate empathy conditions (who experienced a deliberate appeal to a common 
identification with the out-group) to be the only group to indicate strong willingness to 
include extend procedural justice reasoning to out-groups. Inspection of Table 7, 
however, indicates mean values above the scale’s mid-point across experimental 
conditions, suggesting that participants in this study were relatively willing to extend 
procedural justice considerations to groups as a whole, even without an appeal to 
superordinate identification.  
Perhaps because of the relatively high mean values of the procedural justice 
variable across experimental conditions, results of the inferential analyses suggest that 
neither perspective taking nor group-stereotype manipulations affected the degree to 
which participants were willing to extend procedural justice considerations to out-groups. 
The pattern of means offers suggestive evidence, however, of the benefits of 
superordinate identification in some circumstances. Specifically, the rank order of the 
magnitude of the means across warmth conditions indicates that the value of 
superordinate identification may be the most pronounced when groups are described as 
socially cold. That is, only when groups are described as cold are the means for the 
superordinate perspective-taking conditions the highest of the four perspective-taking 
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levels. That said, these differences were not statistically significant. Because evidence 
suggests that the group-stereotype manipulations for the warmth and competence 
dimensions were weaker than expected, a conclusion that these variables don’t affect 
procedural justice concerns may be too hasty. It remains an interesting question for future 
research to investigate if a stronger (and conceptually cleaner) manipulation of group 
stereotypes will impact willingness to extend justice considerations to out-groups.  
The competence dimension, in particular, should be of interest in future studies 
for a variety of reasons. First, although participants indicated significantly more personal 
distress after reading about groups that were described as incompetent, only participants 
who read about competent groups were significantly more willing to engage in helping 
behaviors requiring effort (and also those requiring trust, though this effect was only 
marginally significant). Second, two of the three measures of cognitive overlap (self-
Wallonian overlap and Wallonian-American overlap) had main effects for competence 
such that ratings of these measures were significantly higher for participants who read 
about competent groups compared to incompetent groups. These findings suggest that 
whereas participants are more distressed when reading about a stressful experience that 
was had by an incompetent out-group, they are only more likely to extend effortful 
helping behaviors toward out-groups that they believe to be competent. Thus, the results 
of this study suggest that helping of out-groups is not associated with increased levels of 
personal distress.  
Interestingly, there was no main effect of competence for the group identification 
measure. To the extent that participants experienced increases in perceptions of cognitive 
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overlap between themselves and Wallonians and between Americans and Wallonians as 
the result of the competence manipulation, it seems reasonable to expect similar effects of 
competence on the group identification variable, as group identification and self-other 
overlap are related constructs. Instead, however, there was a main effect of the warmth 
dimension on mean levels of group identification such that participants who read about 
socially warm groups reported significantly higher levels of identification with the out-
group than did those who read about socially cold groups. Importantly, the questions that 
made up the group identification measure were those such as ―How much do you like this 
group?‖, and ―How much would you like to spend time with this group in the future?‖ It 
may be the case, therefore, that whereas the competence stereotype influences cognitive 
dimensions of affiliation with others (i.e., self-other overlap), stereotypes about warmth 
influence the affective dimension of affiliation with others.  
In terms of applied significance, the results reported here suggest that groups 
associated with certain characteristics (i.e., competence and intelligence) are more likely 
to receive help from others than groups associated with other characteristics (i.e., 
incompetence and ignorance). Thus, focused efforts should be made to highlight the 
competence and intelligence of out-groups that are in need of help. The results reported 
here also suggest that efforts to help out-groups that are perceived as socially cold should 
not attempt to elicit empathy to motivate helping behavior. Indeed, the results of the 
present study suggest that appeals to empathy for such groups actually decrease 
willingness to help. Efforts in these situations may be better spent trying to focus on the 
extent to which out-groups who are socially cold are intelligent and competent. Finally, if 
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it is simply not possible to mitigate the impact of stereotypes about the social coldness of 
out-groups, the research presented here suggests that instilling an overarching 
identification with socially cold out-groups may be necessary in order to elicit empathic 
concern toward them. In sum, these results suggest that if the goal is to increase helping 
behavior toward out-groups, then specific strategies should be employed that either 
eliminate or reduce the impact of stereotypes about incompetence, ignorance, and social 
coldness on individuals’ willingness to help others. 
Limitations 
The biggest limitation of the study is that since the Wallonians are a fictional 
group unknown to most people, participants did not have access to any information about 
them other than what was given in the description. Obviously, real-world out-groups are 
nested within a shared social context that this study did not represent, so future research 
should attempt to investigate the relationships suggested here using real-life out-groups. 
That said, one of the main purposes of the current study was to assess the effects of group 
stereotypes on willingness to help out-groups; thus, the benefit of the current study is that 
the content of those stereotypes was experimentally controlled. Control over the content 
of stereotypes about real out-groups would either be impossible or extremely difficult, 
and this could lead to multiple confounds about the inferences drawn about the effects of 
stereotypes on helping.  
Another limitation to the study is suggested by the inspection of the responses to 
the thought-listing task that followed the manipulation of group stereotypes. Specifically, 
very few participants mentioned anything about social warmth or coldness or competence 
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or incompetence. Of those that did mention these things, the majority of responses 
indicated that the description of the event experienced by the Wallonians who were lost 
in the city seemed to contradict the description of the group that was provided. For 
example, participants seemed confused that a group that was supposed to be competent 
and intelligent would not think to ask for directions if they were lost in the city. 
 More problematic is the fact that 44% of the sample mentioned the language 
barrier in their thought listings, even though a language barrier was not included in the 
theorizing about this project. As part of the scenario, a statement was included that the 
description participants were going to read about a recent immigrant group had been 
―translated from the group’s native language.‖ This statement was meant to strengthen 
the perception of the Wallonians as an out-group; however, this statement introduced a 
significant amount of ―noise‖ to the validity of assumptions regarding the effects of 
competence and warmth. The majority of participants who mentioned the language 
barrier in their thought listings argued one of two things. First, participants indicated that 
an inability to understand a foreign language is not and should not be perceived as 
ignorance or incompetence. Second, many participants expressed anger and frustration at 
the Wallonians that they would come to the country without knowledge of the English 
language. Moreover, many participants expressed particular surprise that groups 
described as intelligent and competent would be in a situation that would require 
language competence if they did not know the language.  
The thought listings, therefore, suggest at least two intractable confounds to the 
current research. First, some participants seemed to be disregarding information about 
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incompetence by focusing on the fact that a language barrier can sometimes masquerade 
as ignorance or incompetence. Second, some participants were using information about 
the language barrier to disconfirm stereotypes about competence. In retrospect, the 
sentence about the translation was a mistake, and future research will either not mention 
the language barrier or will explicitly state that the out-groups in question are familiar 
with the English language.   
Regarding the procedural justice findings, one limitation is the ad-hoc nature of 
the measure of procedural justice-related helping behaviors. The scale was developed and 
piloted in the current study, and although initial psychometric evidence suggests that the 
scale is reliable, there is no validity evidence for the scale as of yet. The items of the scale 
were developed from within the framework of procedural justice theory: all items 
reflected questions revolving around the extent to which participants believed that the 
voices of the Wallonians should be heard in American decision-making processes. In this 
regard, the scale has a high degree of face validity. It remains a task of future research, 
however, to establish the validity of this scale further.  
As a final point, the effort to integrate the social-psychological literatures of 
social justice, the empathy-helping behavior relationship, and group stereotypes is going 
to require multiple studies across multiple contexts. As a first investigation, the current 
study, rather than establishing when perspective taking is useful across different types of 
groups, has instead established when such perspective taking backfires. Thus, 
interventions to promote empathy with ingroup members may not be appropriate, and 
may even be detrimental, when used in conjunction with outgroup members.  
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APPENDIX A: 
 
TABLES 
  
 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of effort and trust ratings of helping behaviors 
 
 
 
 
 Behavior M SD 
 
 
Effort 
Hold doors open for Wallonians carrying heavy loads. 1.97 2.72 
Offer to give directions to lost Wallonians. 3.03 2.67 
Invite Wallonians to a weekend barbeque at your home. 4.10 2.56 
Speak up if you see a merchant cheat a Wallonian. 5.52 2.87 
Organize a benefit picnic for Wallonians in your community 6.55 2.25 
 
 
Trust 
Read an informational flier describing the situation of Wallonians in 
America. 
3.28 3.06 
Donate $5.00 to help Wallonians adapt to the city. 4.58 3.0 
Participate in a march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians. 5.59 2.41 
Introduce Wallonians to your personal friends. 6.76 2.37 
Host Wallonians in your home for a month. 8.31 1.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
3
 
  
 
Table 2. Correlations among variables 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Self-Wallonian overlap 1.0 .03 .48** .06 .09 .29** .14** .28** .32** .37** .44** 
2. Self-American overlap  1.0 .28** -.12* -.14** -.10 .03 -.06 -.03 -.09 -.06 
3. American-Wallonian overlap   1.0 .01 -.10 -.04 -.03 .11* .11* .10 .15** 
4. Age    1.0 .01 .10 .01 .04 -.04 .03 .08 
5. Immigration status     1.0 .29** .10 .09 .15** .25** .21** 
6. Empathy      1.0 .25** .35** .43** .52** .50** 
7. Distress       1.0 .08 .15** .10 .09 
8. Total effort        1.0 .59** .46** .43** 
9. Total trust         1.0 .60** .50** 
10. Procedural justice          1.0 .67** 
11. Group identification           1.0 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
8
4
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of distress as a function of experimental 
condition 
 
 
 
  Warmth 
  Warm Cold 
  Competence Competence 
  Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent 
Perspective-taking 
condition 
    
Objective 2.08 (1.13) 2.56 (1.38) 2.13 (1.03) 3.09 (1.58) 
Individual empathy 2.95 (1.58) 2.62 (1.39) 2.72 (1.16) 2.69 (1.46) 
Group empathy 2.95 (1.51) 3.11 (1.37) 3.14 (1.65) 2.93 (1.56) 
Superordinate 
empathy 
 
2.79 (1.67) 2.40 (1.15) 3.19 (1.31) 2.65 (1.46) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses 
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Table 4. Means and standard deviations of empathy as a function of experimental 
condition 
 
 
 
 
  Warmth 
  Warm Cold 
  Competence Competence 
  Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent 
Perspective-taking 
condition 
    
Objective 4.17 (1.74) 4.03 (1.30) 4.07 (1.30) 4.39 (1.06) 
Individual empathy 4.49 (1.33) 4.50 (0.91) 4.17 (1.09) 4.47 (1.04) 
Group empathy 4.71 (1.25) 4.43 (1.31) 4.89 (1.27) 3.82 (1.50) 
Superordinate 
empathy 
 
4.58 (1.26) 4.67 (0.90) 4.73 (1.13) 4.81 (1.23) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses 
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Table 5. Means and standard deviations of effortful helping as a function of experimental 
condition 
 
 
 
  Warmth 
  Warm Cold 
  Competence Competence 
  Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent 
Perspective-taking 
condition 
    
Objective 3.52 (0.87) 3.10 (0.79) 3.19 (0.99) 3.65 (0.99) 
Individual empathy 3.50 (0.76) 3.57 (1.03) 3.55 (1.06) 3.15 (0.75) 
Group empathy 3.62 (0.92) 3.33 (1.02) 3.68 (0.84) 2.95 (1.0) 
Superordinate 
empathy 
 
3.48 (1.08) 3.50 (0.76) 3.64 (0.85)  3.25 (0.97) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Means and standard deviations of trustful helping as a function of experimental 
condition 
 
 
 
  Warmth 
  Warm Cold 
  Competence Competence 
  Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent 
Perspective-taking 
condition 
    
Objective 2.62 (1.24) 2.50 (1.40) 2.29 (1.31) 2.70 (1.17) 
Individual empathy 2.95 (1.19) 2.76 (0.94) 3.09 (1.15) 2.45 (1.36) 
Group empathy 3.05 (1.12) 2.71 (1.19) 2.64 (0.95) 2.15 (1.42) 
Superordinate 
empathy 
 
2.67 (1.11) 2.65 (1.27) 2.95 (1.36) 2.55 (1.36) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Means and standard deviations of procedural justice behaviors as a function of 
experimental condition 
 
 
 
  Warmth 
  Warm Cold 
  Competence Competence 
  Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent 
Perspective-taking 
condition 
    
Objective 5.99 (1.39) 5.38 (1.51) 5.36 (1.35) 5.74 (1.45) 
Individual empathy 5.33 (1.92) 5.68 (1.08) 5.80 (1.43) 5.51 (1.45) 
Group empathy 5.84 (0.95) 5.90 (1.54) 5.64 (1.60) 4.89 (1.91 
Superordinate 
empathy 
 
5.82 (1.55) 5.84 (0.98) 6.16 (1.47) 5.93 (1.42) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
Table 8. Means and standard deviations of group identification as a function of 
experimental condition 
 
 
 
  Warmth 
  Warm Cold 
  Competence Competence 
  Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent 
Perspective-taking 
condition 
    
Objective 6.26 (1.43) 5.98 (1.31) 5.60 (1.30) 5.84 (1.74) 
Individual empathy 6.00 (1.63) 1.67 (1.02) 5.83 (1.76) 5.43 (1.54) 
Group empathy 6.26 (1.23) 5.79 (1.63) 6.03 (1.39) 5.38 (2.04) 
Superordinate 
empathy 
 
6.76 (1.23) 5.90 (1.16) 6.05 (1.23) 6.36 (1.57) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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Table 9. Means and standard deviations of self-Wallonian overlap as a function of 
experimental condition 
 
 
 
  Warmth 
  Warm Cold 
  Competence Competence 
  Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent 
Perspective-taking 
condition 
    
Objective 3.76 (1.48) 3.00 (1.21) 2.71 (1.35) 3.05 (1.43) 
Individual empathy 3.90 (1.71) 3.19 (1.47) 3.00 (1.35) 2.85 (1.60) 
Group empathy 3.33 (1.23) 3.33 (1.23) 3.27 (1.35) 2.55 (1.36) 
Superordinate 
empathy 
 
3.67 (1.56) 2.85 (1.27) 3.91 (1.06) 3.30 (1.59) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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Table 10. Means and standard deviations of self-American overlap as a function of 
experimental condition 
 
 
 
  Warmth 
  Warm Cold 
  Competence Competence 
  Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent 
Perspective-taking 
condition 
    
Objective 4.71 (1.42) 4.85 (1.63) 4.71 (1.87) 5.00 (1.62) 
Individual empathy 4.90 (1.25) 4.71 (1.45) 5.05 (1.17) 5.35 (0.93) 
Group empathy 4.90 (1.55) 5.14 (1.28) 4.36 (1.59) 5.50 (1.61) 
Superordinate 
empathy 
 
5.14 (1.56) 4.71 (1.45) 5.27 (1.55) 5.00 (1.66) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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Table 11. Means and standard deviations of American-Wallonian overlap as a function of 
experimental condition 
 
 
 
  Warmth 
  Warm Cold 
  Competence Competence 
  Competent Incompetent Competent Incompetent 
Perspective-taking 
condition 
    
Objective 3.57 (1.50) 2.75 (1.33) 2.86 (1.46) 3.20 (1.44) 
Individual empathy 3.40 (1.64) 2.43 (0.98) 3.05 (1.53) 3.05 (1.61) 
Group empathy 2.43 (0.81) 2.86 (1.31) 2.77 (1.48) 2.50 (1.40) 
Superordinate 
empathy 
 
3.38 (1.40) 2.80 (1.40) 3.64 (1.43) 3.05 (1.85) 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. 
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 Figure 1. Mean levels of distress as a function of perspective-taking instructions and competence stereotypes. 
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Figure 2. Mean levels of effort as a function of perspective taking, warmth, and competence stereotypes. 
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Questionnaire A: Helping Behavior Scale 
 
Instructions: This study is investigating peoples’ perceptions of the degree to which 
various helpful behaviors towards out-group members require effort and trust. Please 
read the scenario below that describes a particular group. Listed below the scenario are 
several helping behaviors that we’d like you to evaluate according to how much effort 
and trust they would each require.  
 
Effortful Behaviors are those that require conscious and focused trying in pursuit of a 
goal. To require effort in this context means that you will need to dedicate time and/or 
energy on behalf of others. Please rate the extent to which you perceive each behavior to 
require effort on a scale of 0 (not at all effortful) to 9 (extremely effortful). 
 
Trusting Behaviors are those that rely on the character, ability, and truth of another. 
Trust in this context means that you would need to put faith in the character, ability, and 
truth of members of this group before you could engage in the behaviors. Please rate the 
extent to which you perceive each behavior to require trusting in the members of this 
group on a scale of 0 (requires no trust) to 9 (requires a great deal of trust).  
 
Scenario: 
 
Due to political and economic circumstances, United States demographers are predicting 
waves of immigration in the next few years from an ethnic group outside of our borders 
that call themselves the Wallonians. Imagine that you are being asked to provide 
assistance to the Wallonians. Please read each of the behaviors listed below, and indicate 
how much effort and trust you think each behavior would require.  
 
1. Read an informational flier describing the situation facing Wallonians in America. 
       
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
2. Volunteer to give a brief speech at an orientation meeting for Wallonians.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
3. Speak up if you see a shopkeeper or street vendor cheating Wallonians out of correct 
change for purchases. 
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
4. Donate $5.00 to the cause of orienting Wallonians into United States society.  
      
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
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5. Offer to write an article advocating Wallonians in your local newspaper.  
      
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
6. Offer to give directions to Wallonians who are obviously lost in your city.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
7. Help organize a benefit picnic in your community for Wallonians.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
8. Smile at Wallonians when you see them.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
9. Volunteer as an English language tutor to Wallonians on weekends.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
10. Sign a petition to bring the cause of the Wallonians to the attention of your local city 
council. 
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
11. Invite Wallonian children to your home to play with your children (or your younger 
brothers and sisters).  
      
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
12. Invite a family (or families) of Wallonians to your home for a weekend barbeque. 
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
13. Participate in a parade or march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
14. Offer to host Wallonians in your home for a month while they become accustomed to 
life in the United States.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
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15. Campaign for legislation designed to benefit Wallonians.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
 
16. Introduce Wallonians to your personal friends.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
17. Offer to give rides to Wallonians in your personal car.  
      
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
18. Vote in support of social policies designed to benefit Wallonians.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
19. Volunteer to act as a city services tour guide for Wallonians. 
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
20. Hold doors open for Wallonians who are carrying heavy loads. 
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
21. Offer to jump a car for Wallonians who are stranded on the side of the road.  
 
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
 
22. Offer to help Wallonians dig out cars from underneath snow drifts in the winter. 
      
____Effort  (0 – 9)      ____Trust (0 – 9) 
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Questionnaire B: Guttman Scales of Helping Behavior 
 
Please check in the space next to the items below if you’d be willing to engage in the 
following behaviors. 
 
I. Effort 
 
_____ Hold doors open for Wallonians carrying heavy loads.  
 
_____ Offer to give directions to lost Wallonians. 
 
_____ Invite Wallonians to a weekend barbeque at your home. 
 
_____  Speak up if you see a Wallonian being cheated by a shopkeeper. 
 
_____  Help organize a benefit picnic in the community for Wallonians. 
 
Please check in the space next to the items below if you’d be willing to engage in the 
following behaviors. 
  
II. Trust 
 
_____  Read an informational flier describing the situation of Wallonians in America. 
 
_____  Donate $5.00 to helping Wallonians orient to Chicago. 
 
_____  Participate in a parade or march to advocate tolerance for Wallonians. 
 
_____  Introduce Wallonians to your personal friends. 
 
_____  Offer to host Wallonians in home for a month. 
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Questionnaire C: Demographic Questions 
 
Please respond to the following demographic questions below. 
 
1. What is your age? ________ 
 
2. What is your gender?   
 
a. Male 
b. Female 
 
3. What is your ethnicity? 
 
a. Caucasian 
b. African-American / Black 
c. Asian 
d. Latino/a 
e. Middle Eastern 
f. Other (please indicate): _____________ 
 
4. To what extent do you perceive your family to be immigrants to America? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not  at all            Very Much 
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Questionnaire D: Perspective-Taking Instructions 
 
Instructions: 
 
This research is part of an effort to get student input regarding American society’s 
reactions to groups of incoming immigrants. Due to political and economic 
circumstances, United States demographers are predicting waves of immigration in the 
next few years from an ethnic group outside of our borders that call themselves the 
Wallonians. Several hundred Wallonians have already arrived in the United States, and 
the government is interested in the experiences that they’ve had so far.  
 
(Participants who will take the perspectives of groups as a whole will read one of the two 
following paragraphs, depending on experimental condition):  
 
Condition 1: Group Empathy Condition: 
 
We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had 
in Chicago. While you are reading the description, try to imagine how the Wallonians 
feel about what has happened to them as a group, and how it affects their lives. Try to 
feel the full impact of what the Wallonians have been through and how they feel as a 
result. The description that follows has been translated from the Wallonian’s native 
language.  
 
Condition 2: Superordinate Empathy Condition:  
 
We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had 
in Chicago. Since America is a nation of immigrants, all citizens have in common that 
our ancestors were immigrants into a new country. Because of this commonality, we 
should all be able to understand the experience of getting used to life in a new country. 
When reading the description that follows, consider the fact that all Americans (including 
your ancestors) were immigrants at one time. Think about the experience described 
below as an example of the difficulties associated with becoming new Americans in 
general. That is, as you read the statement below, please consider how the Wallonians’ 
experience is similar to the experiences that face all groups of new Americans. Think 
about how your own ancestors as well as other past immigrant groups felt as you think 
about the Wallonians’ experience. While you are reading the description, try to imagine 
how the Wallonians feel about what has happened to them, and how it affects their lives. 
Try to feel the full impact of what the Wallonians have been through and how they feel as 
a result. The description that follows has been translated from the Wallonian’s native 
language.  
 
(Participants who will take the perspective of individuals will read one of the two 
following paragraphs, depending on experimental condition): 
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Condition 3: Individual Empathy Condition: 
 
We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had 
in Chicago. While you are reading the description, try to imagine how the author of the 
description feels about what has happened to him or her, and how it may have affected 
his or her life. Try to feel the full impact of what the individual has been through and how 
he or she feels as a result. The description that follows has been translated from the 
Wallonian’s native language:  
 
Condition 4: Individual Objective Condition: 
 
 We would like for you to read about a recent experience that a group of Wallonians had 
in Chicago. While you are reading the description, try to be as objective as possible about 
what has happened to the author. To remain objective, do not let yourself get caught up in 
imagining what he or she has been through and how he or she feels as a result. Just try to 
remain detached as you read the description. The description that follows has been 
translated from the Wallonian’s native language: 
 
(All participants will then read the following scenario): 
 
My friends and I were traveling to see the sights downtown. We were not familiar with 
Chicago’s bus and train system, and we ended up getting off the train a few stops early. 
We decided to walk the remaining blocks to reach our destination, but we became 
extremely lost. We could not make sense of the city maps we had, because we were not 
familiar enough with English to understand many of the terms. We were quickly 
overwhelmed by the noise and activity level of the city, and we quickly became 
disoriented and confused. It was a very scary experience for us. How will we ever adjust 
to life in this city? 
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Questionnaire E: Empathic Concern 
 
Participants will indicate the extent to which they experienced the following emotions on 
a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely): 
 
1. I felt sympathetic.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. I felt softhearted.       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. I felt warm.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. I felt compassionate.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. I felt tender.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. I felt moved.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Questionnaire F: Personal Distress Scale 
 
Participants will indicate the extent to which they experienced the following emotions on 
a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely): 
 
1.  Alarmed 
 
2.  Troubled 
 
3.  Distressed 
 
4.  Upset 
 
5.  Disturbed 
 
(Taken from:  Maner, J. K., Luce, C. L., Neuberg, S. L., Cialdini, R. B., Brown, S., & 
Sagarin, B. J. (2002). The effects of perspective taking on motivations for helping: Still 
no evidence for altruism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1601-1610.) 
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Questionnaire G: Procedural Justice-Helping Behaviors 
 
All items will be measured on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). 
 
1. How likely are you to vote in support of social policies designed to protect the rights 
of Wallonians? 
 
2. How likely are you to sign a petition to bring the cause of the Wallonians to the 
attention of your local city council?  
 
3. How likely are you to campaign for legislation designed to protect the rights of 
Wallonians? 
 
4. How likely are you to volunteer your time to raise money for a town hall meeting 
where Wallonians can express their concerns? 
 
5. How likely are you to support policies that take the perspective of the Wallonians into 
account? 
 
6. How likely are you to support community decisions that haven’t considered the 
voices of the Wallonians? 
 
7. How likely are you to support equal representation for Wallonians in community 
decision-making? 
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Questionnaire H: Group Identification 
 
All items will be measured on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). 
 
Group Attraction 
 
1. How much do you like the Wallonians? 
 
2. How much would you like to socialize with the Wallonians? 
 
3. How much would you like to take a class with members of the Wallonians? 
 
4. How much would you like to discuss issues with the Wallonians? 
 
Group/Self Similarity 
 
1. How similar are members of the Wallonians to people who are important to you? 
 
2. How similar are members of the Wallonians to you? 
109 
 
 
Self 
Self 
Americans 
Questionnaire I : Inclusion of Other in Self Scales 
 
1. Self / Wallonians overlap.  
 
Instructions: Please circle the figure that best describes how you see the Wallonians in 
relation to yourself.  
 
      
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Self / American overlap 
Instructions: Please circle the figure that best describes how you see Americans in 
relation to yourself.  
 
      
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
3. American / Wallonian overlap 
 
Instructions: Please circle the figure that best describes how you see the Wallonians in 
relation to Americans.  
 
      
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
Self Self Self 
 
 Wallonians 
Self Self 
Self 
Wallonians 
Wallonians Wallonians Wallonians 
       Wallonians 
 
Wallonians 
 
Self Self Self 
 
 Americans 
Self Self 
Self 
Americans 
Americans Americans Americans 
       Americans 
 
Americans 
 
  Americans Americans 
Americans 
 
 Wallonians 
Americans Americans 
Americans 
Wallonians 
Wallonians Wallonians  
Wallonians 
       Wallonians 
 
Wallonians 
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